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I. INTRODUCTION 
This section of the Symposium focuses on trade-offs that inhere in the 
criminal justice system, tradeoffs neatly encapsulated in Blackstone’s 
famous ten-to-one ratio of guilty persons who should be allowed escape 
justice rather than an innocent suffer.  Blackstone’s aphorism reminds us not 
only of the importance of ensuring that innocent persons are not convicted, 
but also that unbounded protections might unduly interfere with convicting 
the guilty. 
A serious attempt to think about these trade-offs comes from Professor 
Larry Laudan’s thoughtful contribution to this symposium1 – as well as his 
more detailed exposition of his thesis in his book2 and earlier articles with 
symposium participant Professor Ron Allen.3  For example, here in his 
symposium piece, Professor Laudan argues for two different burdens of 
proof at criminal trials: a new clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for 
trials of known serial offenders and the conventional and higher beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard for everyone else.4 Laudan highlights the costs of 
wrongful acquittals (“false negatives”) that have to be weighed against the 
costs of wrongful convictions (“false positives”).  In making his calculations, 
Professor Laudan draws upon Professor Risinger’s important article on the 
subject.5 
 
 
 1  See Larry Laudan, Different Strokes for Different Folks: Fixing the Error Pattern in 
Criminal Prosecutions by “Empiricizing” the Rules of Criminal Law and Taking False 
Acquittals and Serial Offenders Seriously, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1243 (2018). 
 2  LARRY LAUDAN, THE LAW’S FLAWS: RETHINKING TRIALS AND ERRORS? (2016).   
 3  Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 65 
(2008). 
 4  Laudan, supra note 1, at 1251–52.   
 5  Laudan, supra note 1, at 1245 (citing D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted, 97 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007)); see also LAUDAN, supra note 2, at 54.  
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In this Symposium, Professors Marvin Zalman and Keith Findley have 
both written thoughtful responses to Laudan. Of most interest for my 
purposes is Zalman’s, who contends that the “anti-Blackstonians”—
including Laudan—improperly reject Blackstone’s cautions about the need 
to have strong safeguards against convicting the innocent.6  In his far-ranging 
article, Zalman says that he writes from an “innocentric” perspective.7  He 
critiques the views of legal scholars whom he identifies as “anti-
Blackstonians,” arguing that they would “neutralize the theory of pro-
defendant procedural asymmetry.”8  Zalman argues that these scholars lack 
empirical support for their positions or, to the extent support exists, relevant 
evidence has been ignored. 
Curiously, Zalman includes me among the anti-Blackstonians, even 
though he acknowledges that I “accept[] the Blackstone principle.”9  If I 
understand his argument correctly, he starts from the fact that my previous 
writings have properly called attention to the need to consider not only the 
risk of wrongfully convicting an innocent person, but also need to prevent 
new crimes that might result when a guilty person escapes conviction.  
According to Zalman, I would achieve this laudable goal “by neutralizing 
the theory of pro-defendant procedural asymmetry, by reducing the standard 
of proof, and by eliminating some procedural protections” and thus it is “no 
stretch” to describe me as an “anti-Blackstonian.”10  Laudan reviews a 
number of proposals I have made for reforming the criminal justice system,11 
raising questions about each of them. 
In my contribution to this symposium, I respond to both Professors 
Laudan and Zalman and make two main points.  First, in Part I, I turn to 
Laudan’s policy proposal for reducing the number of wrongful acquittals – 
e.g., lowering the prosecution’s burden of proof at trial for previously-
convicted felons to clear and convincing evidence.  This proposal is 
unconstitutional under existing Supreme Court precedents, which interpret 
the Constitution to require the prosecutor to prove a defendant’s guilty by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  And in addition, Laudan has failed to 
demonstrate that his proposal is cost-beneficial because he has not 
 
 6  Marvin Zalman, The Anti-Blackstonians, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1319 (2018).   
 7  Id. at 1325 (citing Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549 (2008).   
 8  Id. at 1324. 
 9  Id. at 1322 (citing Paul G. Cassell, Freeing the Guilty Without Protecting the Innocent: 
Some Skeptical Observations on Proposed New “Innocence” Procedures, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 1063, 1065 (2012) [hereinafter Cassell, Freeing the Guilty]).   
 10  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1324.   
 11  See Paul G. Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent without Freeing the Guilty: 
Thoughts on Innocence Reforms that Avoid Harmful Tradeoffs, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 264 (Daniel 
Medwed ed. 2017) [hereinafter Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent?].  
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persuasively articulated a way to weigh the costs of wrongful convictions 
against those of wrongful acquittals. But I offer a “friendly amendment” to 
Laudan’s idea.  It should be possible to capture almost all of the benefits of 
his proposal by placing violent felons on extended periods of parole or 
supervised release – a condition of which would be that they not commit new 
crimes.  Then, when a previously-convicted felon is arrested for a new crime, 
he could be tried for a parole violation rather than given a new trial.  Supreme 
Court precedent allows parole violations to be tried under a lower burden of 
proof.  And thus, under this approach, the Laudan idea could be 
operationalized consistently with the Constitution.  Reconfigured in this 
way, there are strong reasons for thinking that the proposal might well be a 
cost-beneficial way of reducing wrongful acquittals. 
In Part II, I challenge Professor Zalman’s claim that he is truly writing 
from an innocentric perspective.  Someone proceeding from this vantage 
should be willing to endorse a criminal justice reform measure if it meets 
three criteria: first and most important, it reduces wrongful convictions of 
the innocent; second, it does not reduce (and ideally would increase) the 
number of guilty persons convicted; and third, it should not significantly 
impair any other competing values.  With these evaluative criteria in mind, 
Zalman appears to be a mere fair-weather friend of the innocent, as he does 
not appear to truly privilege innocence over other competing values.  In 
contrast, my reform proposals (which Zalman is reluctant to endorse) 
reorient the criminal justice system away from adjudicating procedural 
issues and toward adjudicating substantive issues of guilt or innocence. The 
truly innocent will benefit in a system that values substance over procedure 
– and someone who truly holds an innocentric perspective should endorse 
reforms that move the criminal justice system in that direction. 
II. ANALYZING THE RISKS OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND WRONGFUL 
ACQUITTALS 
Properly structuring defendants’ rights in our criminal justice system 
presents the problem of tradeoffs – specifically that in our effort to prevent 
the innocent from suffering from a wrongful conviction, we might release 
the guilty through what can be described as a “wrongful acquittal.”  In this 
section, I turn to how we might address these tradeoffs.  My springboard for 
discussion is Professor Laudan’s proposal in this symposium to reduce the 
prosecution’s burden of proof to convict a particularly dangerous subset of 
the criminal suspects. 
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For “known serial offenders,” Laudan suggests that the prosecution 
should have to prove guilt only by clear and convincing evidence, rather than 
by the traditional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.12  This 
section makes three points about this idea.  First, Laudan’s proposal directly 
creates Blackstonian tradeoffs – additional guilty persons convicted, but at 
the expense of innocents suffering.  His proposal is almost certainly 
unconstitutional and, perhaps more important for these purposes, is not 
necessarily desirable under simply cost-benefit calculations.  Second, in 
theory a way to avoid such dilemmas would be to give the criminal justice 
system more evidence about guilty and innocent suspects.  For example, as 
a thought experiment, giving crystal balls to police officers so that they have 
more insight into possible guilt or innocence would—for any level of 
proof—both increases the number of guilty suspects who could be punished 
and decreases the number of innocents who would suffer.  Third, the real 
world criminal justice system could be reformed in ways that would be the 
functional equivalent of giving law enforcement crystal balls.  For example, 
we might give the police greater power to search for evidence or to interview 
suspects—something that is constitutionally permissible for convicted 
persons who are on parole (the kind of “known serial offenders” that Laudan 
is particularly concerned about).  Building on this insight, I sketch out a 
“friendly amendment” to Laudan’s proposal that would largely retain the 
benefits he seeks by placing more offenders on parole for longer periods of 
time—thereby giving police greater power to collect evidence and 
statements from them.  This approach would both avoid the constitutional 
objection to his proposal and, even more important, reduce the deadly 
dilemma that creates the most concern about his idea. 
A. Laudan’s Unconstitutional (and Perhaps Undesirable) Proposal 
to Change the Burden of Proof at Trial 
Laudan makes the interesting proposal that we should lower the 
prosecution’s burden of proof for trials involving previously-convicted 
violent felons.  Laudan begins his argument by showing that, on “rational 
analysis,” false acquittals are “much more frequent than false convictions.”13  
On this point I fully agree with him,14 and I doubt whether any of the other 
symposium participants dispute the point.  Reasoning from this premise, 
 
 12  Laudan, supra note 1, at 1250.   
 13  Laudan, supra note 1, at 1253.   
 14  For extended discussion of the rate of wrongful convictions, compare Paul G. Cassell, 
Overstating America’s Wrongful Conviction Rate? Reassessing the Conventional Wisdom 
About the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), with 
George C. Thomas III, Where Have All the Innocents Gone?, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2018), with Paul G. Cassell, Jurisdiction-Specific Wrongful Conviction Rate Estimates: The 
North Carolina and Utah Examples, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).  
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Laudan also notes that a subset of false acquittals – those involving persons 
he describes as “known serial offenders” – are particularly costly to society.  
Serial offenders (i.e., recidivists) are likely to commit a disproportionate 
number of crimes, a fact well established in the criminology literature.15  
Laudan, for example, estimates that the average serial felon has a recidivism 
rate 300% higher than the average non-serial felon.16 
Based on these well-founded factual premises, Laudan proposes that 
the prosecution’s burden of proof for establishing guilt should be retained 
for first-time offenders, while for “serial” or second-time offenders, it should 
be reduced to something approaching clear and convincing evidence.  
Laudan reasons that the cost of wrongful acquittals is particularly high for 
the serial offenders, who are particularly likely to commit additional crimes.  
Accordingly, Laudan reasons that these different risks should be reflected in 
differing burdens of proof. 
Laudan has quite commendably given close attention to the competing 
tradeoffs, building on important work on this subject with co-author (and 
Symposium participant)  Professor Ronald J. Allen) entitled “Deadly 
Dilemmas”17 and his book THE LAW’S FLAWS: RETHINKING TRIAL AND 
ERRORS?18  The key point in these works is  that “[w]hile the prospect of 
convicting or executing a truly innocent person is horrifying, this type of 
mistake occurs within a highly complicated matrix of relationships where 
other equally horrifying mistakes go unnoticed in the conventional 
discourse.”19  Allen and Laudan quite properly remind us that conviction of 
an innocent person is not the only kinds of tragedy that the criminal justice 
system must be concerned about.20  An ineffective criminal justice system 
 
 15  See, e.g., BARRY LATZER, THE RISE AND FALL OF VIOLENT CRIME IN AMERICA 230–32 
(2017).   
 16  Laudan, supra note 1, at 1253.  Laudan had previously used higher numbers and had 
estimated that “every false acquittal enables more than thirty-six crimes (including on average 
seven violent ones) during the time when, but for the false acquittal, the defendant would have 
been incapacitated.  Larry Laudan, The Rules of Trial, Political Morality, and the Costs of 
Error: Or, Is Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Doing More Harm than Good?, in 1 OXFORD 
STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195, 202 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011).  But cf. 
Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1090–
91 (2015) (critiquing this estimate).  The 1.2 figure that Lauder uses here strikes me as 
extraordinarily conservative. 
 17  Allen & Laudan, supra note 3; see also Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, Deadly 
Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (2010); Ronald J. Allen & Larry 
Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas III: Some Kind Words for Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 781 (2011).   
 18  LAUDAN, supra note 2.  
 19  Allen & Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 3, at 68.   
 20  See Paul G. Cassell, Freeing the Guilty Without Protecting the Innocent: Some 
Skeptical Observations on Proposed New “Innocence” Procedures, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
1063 (2011); see also Alec Walen, Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Balanced 
Retributive Account, 76 LA. L. REV. 344, 363–75 (2015). 
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can leave criminals free to harm victims and their families, causing 
tremendous suffering.21  As Josh Marquis has cogently observed, “The 
justice system is far from perfect and has made many mistakes, mostly in 
favor of the accused.  Hundreds, if not thousands, have died or lost their 
livelihood through embezzlement or rape because the American justice 
system failed to incarcerate people who were guilty by any definition.”22 
In their earlier work, Laudan and Allen recognize that some public 
policy reform measures that reduce the risk of convicting an innocent person 
may simultaneously increase the risk that a guilty criminal will escape 
conviction and go on to commit additional violent crimes against additional 
victims.  In this particular paper, Laudan defends his own public policy 
reform designed to recalibrate the tradeoffs.  Unfortunately, his proposal (as 
he presents it) suffers from two significant problems.  First, it is 
unconstitutional.  And second, he has failed to clearly demonstrate that its 
benefits would outweigh the costs. 
1. The Unconstitutionality of Lowering Burdens of Proof at 
Trial 
Perhaps Laudan merely intends for his proposal to serve as a catalyst 
for more robust thinking about burdens of proof, but as a serious policy 
proposal it is a non-starter.  Laudan’s proposal is unconstitutional, at least 
under existing Supreme Court doctrine.  The Supreme Court’s decision in In 
re Winship23 constitutionalized the prosecution’s burden of proof in criminal 
cases to be beyond a reasonable doubt.  As explained in Winship, the 
reasonable doubt standard “plays a vital role in the American scheme of 
criminal procedure.  It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of 
convictions resting on factual error.  The standard provides concrete 
substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock axiomatic and 
elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law.”24  Winship also noted that the proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard has deep historical roots, crystalizing in 
its current phrasing around 1798 and commanding “virtually unanimous 
 
 21  See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 611, 629–30 (2009) (collecting citations to examples of victim impact statements).   
 22  Josh Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501, 517–18 
(2005).   
 23  See id. at 11 (discussing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).   
 24  In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363; see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1985) 
(“The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that places an individual’s life 
or liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling. Indeed, the host of safeguards fashioned by 
this Court over the years to diminish the risk of erroneous conviction stands as a testament to 
that concern”); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (“concern about the injustice that 
results from the conviction of an innocent person has long been at the core of our criminal 
justice system”).  
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adherence . . . in common law jurisdictions”25—a fact of particular power for 
those concerned about insuring that criminal defendants continue to receive 
the protections to which they were originally entitled under the 
Constitution.26  Later decisions from the Court have only reinforced the 
Court’s commitment to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  I find myself in 
full agreement with Professor Findley who, writing in this symposium, also 
believes Laudan’s proposal to be unconstitutional because proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is “so thoroughly entrenched in constitutional doctrine that 
it is inconceivable the courts will abandon it any time soon.”27 
Perhaps Laudan intends his exercise to be merely a theoretical one,28 
because he devotes just a few sentences in his paper to addressing this 
obvious constitutional issue.  Against such well-established precedent, 
Laudan points briefly to the fact that, at sentencing, repeat felons receive 
longer sentences than first-time offenders without violating due process, 
suggesting that this demonstrates that a change in the burden of proof at trial 
would likewise be permissible.  But sentencing procedures involve, by 
definition, defendants who have already been proven to be guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt at trial.  Lower burdens of proof at sentencing provide no 
precedent for changing burdens at trial.29  Laudan also points to the fact that 
“affirmative defenses” can be rebutted by the prosecution by proof less 
compelling than beyond a reasonable double.30  But here again, the Supreme 
Court has been clear that the reason for this treatment of defenses is that the 
prosecution will have already, by assumption, proven that the defendant 
guilty of having committed a crime, leaving the only remaining question to 
be whether to allow some sort of defense to that guilt.31  For example, a 
 
 25  Winship, 397 U.S. at 361.  For further discussion of the history, see, e.g., Anthony 
Marano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 
507 (1975); Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt,” 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979 (1993); 
see also Joel S. Johnson, Note, Benefits of Error in Criminal Justice, 102 VA. L. REV. 237 
(2016).   
 26  As discussed below, see infra notes and accompanying text, I have such concerns.   
 27  Keith A. Findley, Reducing Error in the Criminal Justice System, 48 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1265 (2018).  
 28  Alternatively, Laudan might believe that Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in In re 
Winship might become ascendant.  Winship, 397 U.S. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting).  While 
Justice Black raises some interesting arguments, nothing in recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence suggests that the Court will revisit the question.  
 29  See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (approving as constitutional lower 
burden of proof at sentencing). 
 30  Laudan, supra note 1, at 1257.   
 31  See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (approving burden shifting on 
manslaughter mitigation of murder because “in each instance of a murder conviction under 
the present law New York will have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has 
intentionally killed another person, an act which it is not disputed the State may 
constitutionally criminalize and punish. If the State nevertheless chooses to recognize a factor 
that mitigates the degree of criminality or punishment, we think the State may assure itself 
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defendant may have gunned down a victim in cold-blood – the crime of 
murder.  But society may choose to create an insanity defense, requiring the 
defendant to prove that he is insane.  Treatment of such defenses tells us little 
about due process principles ungirding trials to determine whether a 
defendant has committed a crime. 
2. Weighing the Costs of Wrongful Convictions Against the 
Costs of Wrongful Acquittals 
Even if we set aside the constitutional deficiency, a second serious 
problem with Laudan’s argument is that it assumes the desirability of 
changing the burden of proof revolves around a single metric: the harms an 
erroneously released offender will inflict by committing additional crimes.  
Relying on articles by Professors John Kaplan and Laurence Tribe,32 Laudan 
believes that it is possible to simply look to the number of wrongfully 
convicted persons and the number of crimes committed by violent felons to 
calculate an appropriate burden of proof.  Under Laudan’s analysis (at least 
as presented in this symposium33), the cost of a wrongful conviction is set at 
1 and that cost is assumed to be equal to a crime committed by a released 
felon.34  Laudan then adds in the factually-grounded assumption that each 
released criminal would have committed (at least) 1.2 crimes if not 
incarcerated.  This assumption rests on the fact that criminals have high rates 
of recidivism and, if not restrained, may commit many (perhaps dozens) of 
crimes before being caught.35  For example, in an earlier article, Laudan 
estimated that “every false acquittal enables more than thirty-six crimes 
(including on average seven violent ones) during the time when, but for the 
false acquittal, the defendant would have been incapacitated.”36 
In his explication of the argument here, Laudan uses the quite 
conservative assumption of 1.2 crimes attributed to a criminal not 
incarcerated.37  With these metrics in place, it becomes a straightforward 
 
that the fact has been established with reasonably certainty.”).   
 32  John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Fact-Finding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 
(1968); Laurence Tribe, Trial By Mathematics, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).   
 33  In fairness to Laudan, he has a book-length defense of some of his proposals in 
LAUDAN, supra note 2, although it appears that the many of the issues I present here apply 
equally to his arguments there.   
 34  See Laudan, supra note 1, at 1250.   
 35  See JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 145–58 (1983).   
 36  Larry Laudan, The Rules of Trial, Political Morality, and the Costs of Error: Or, Is 
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Doing More Harm than Good?, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195, 202 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011).  But cf. Epps, supra 
note 16, at 1090–91 (critiquing this estimate).   
 37  Cf. Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Characterizing Criminal Careers, 237 
SCIENCE 985 (1987) (offenders who had previously been arrested twice were found to have 
committed between nine and seventeen serious offenses per year free); PETER W. 
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mathematical exercise, involving simple division of the harms from 
wrongful acquittals divided by the harm of wrongful convictions., to 
determine the optimal standard of proof.38  The cost of a wrongful conviction 
is 2.2 using this metric (1 wrongful conviction + 1.2 crimes probably 
committed by the true perpetrator who escaped conviction), while the cost 
of a wrongful acquittal is 1.2 (the 1.2 crimes that the criminal who escapes 
justice is likely to go on to commit).  Relying on the ratio of 1.2 over 2.2, 
Laudan concludes that while the cost of a wrongful conviction is marginally 
higher than that of wrongful acquittal, the net balance (using the 
methodologies from Professors Kaplan and Tribe) suggests the burden of 
proof should be around 65% accuracy – something akin to clear and 
convincing evidence.39 
But calculating this ratio requires a much richer assessment of costs and 
benefits than Laudan attempts here.40  For starters, Laudan focuses on 
individual costs and benefits – i.e., the cost to the person wrongfully 
convicted.  But significant societal costs likely attach to wrongful 
convictions, such as lack of public confidence in the criminal justice system 
and perhaps in the government itself.41  This lack of confidence may, in turn, 
create additional instrumental costs, such as the failure of witnesses to come 
forward to report crimes. 
Laudan also needs to more fully consider the interesting argument made 
by Risinger (among others in a long tradition tracing back to Immanuel Kant) 
that the State bears a “special responsibility to insure that the innocents that 
it sweeps up in carrying out its crime-control functions are not convicted”—
a responsibility that exceeds its obligations to prevent crime that is the “free-
will-based choice” of a criminal.42  Despite its venerable tradition, this 
“special-responsibility” argument taken in isolation strikes me as ultimately 
unpersuasive, at least when applied to the contemporary American society. 
A more robust assessment of the State’s responsibilities is required.  For 
 
GREENWOOD, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION 45 (1983) (median number of burglaries committed 
by inmates was five per year, but the top ten percent of offenders committed an average of 
232 burglaries a year).   
 38  More precisely, the formula for determining Standard of Proof (SoP) can be expressed 
as SoP = 1/[1 + (harm F- / harm F+), with the critical ratio being the harms from wrongful 
acquittal (F-) divided by the harms from wrongful conviction (F+).   
 39  See Laudan, supra note 1, at 1253.   
 40  See generally Alec Walen, Book Review, (Oct. 2017), http://clcjbooks.rutgers.edu/
books/the-laws-flaws-rethinking-trial-and-errors/.  For recent and comprehensive efforts to 
lay out a theoretical framework for evaluating such tradeoffs, see Epps, supra note 16; Walen, 
supra note 20.  
 41  For a helpful discussion of this point, see Walen, supra note 20, at 365–67.   
 42  Risinger, supra note 11, at 1020.  See also Allen & Laudan, supra note 6, at 81–84 
(discussing arguments by Ronald Dworkin and Immanuel Kant); Epps, supra note 16, at 
1133–35.   
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example, providing security against crime—particularly for society’s most 
vulnerable members—could also be described as something for which the 
government has a “special” responsibility.  And the need for the government 
shouldering a special responsibility for pursuing criminals seems much 
clearer today, given that the government has essentially obtained a monopoly 
over the American criminal justice apparatus, displacing an earlier system in 
which private prosecution was a possibility.43 
But such philosophical debates are unlikely to ever be resolved.  So 
setting them aside, even if we focus exclusively on the quantifiable 
individual costs of a wrongful conviction, the societal costs of a single 
wrongful felony conviction are probably higher than the societal costs of 
single violent crime (setting aside the special case of homicide).  To be sure, 
quantifying the tradeoffs are not simple.  Take, for instance, the costs of 
crime.  Writing in this symposium, Professor Findley raised this issue nicely 
when he explained that “[s]imply counting repeat offenses, even repeat 
violent offenses, masks wide variations in conduct and harm. A violent crime 
might be anything from premeditated murder to a barroom tussle, or an 
unwanted shove or slap.”44  And on the other hand, the costs of wrongful 
conviction could well be greater, for reasons articulated nicely, again, by 
Professor Findley.45 
But I part company with Professor Findley when he seemingly throws 
his hands up in despair at the difficulties of assessing the competing costs.46  
Society is constantly called upon to assess tradeoffs, such as when 
considering highway safety proposals or new drug approval or any of a 
variety of other public policy measures.  For example, we set speed limits on 
our nation’s interstate highways at around 70 to 80 miles per hour, even 
though we know that a 35 m.p.h. limit would be much safer.  We value the 
utility of driving quickly over the quality of driving more safely – a decision 
informed by research on the risks of driving fast and the costs of traffic 
accidents. 
We can make similar decisions with regard to our criminal justice 
system.  One way to quantify the comparative costs or wrongful conviction 
with wrongful acquittal would be compare jury verdicts (or civil settlements) 
in cases of wrongful conviction with jury verdicts in cases of criminal 
assaults.  Data published in 1999 suggest, for example, that the loss per 
 
 43   See William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: 
The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649 (1976); see generally DOUGLAS E. 
BELOOF ET AL., VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 214–83 (3d ed. 2010) (describing current 
charging practices in American criminal justice, which largely prevent victim-initiated 
charges).   
 44  Findley, supra note 27, at 1272.   
 45  Id. at 1275–77. 
 46  Id. at 1277.   
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criminal victimization can be quantified as $2,940,000 for a murder, $87,000 
for a sexual assault, and $19,000 for a robbery with injury.47  A more recent 
updating of this study estimated the total tangible plus intangible per offense 
cost for different crimes (in 2008 dollars).  The study concluded that the loss 
per crime victimization can be quantified as $8,982,907 for a murder, 
$240,776 for a rape/sexual assault, $107,020 for an aggravated assault, and 
$42,310 for a robbery.48 
How might we weigh these costs against the cost of wrongful 
convictions?  In his longer book on this subject, Laudan makes a modest – 
but ultimately inadequate – effort to quantify the costs of wrongful 
conviction.  Laudan sets these costs at around $30,000 per year, based on the 
costs to society of building a prison to incarcerate the wrongfully convicted 
person.49  Laudan then discounts these costs slightly, given that “a substantial 
portion of those convicted of violent crimes were unemployed and receiving 
welfare when they committed their crimes.”50  But these calculations 
consider only society’s hard or “out-of-pocket” costs to imprisoning the 
innocent, not the suffering that Blackstone and others have long identified as 
part of the calculus.  Until Laudan makes some sort of effort to consider these 
costs in his cost-benefit equation, he cannot carry his burden of proof of 
demonstrating that change is appropriate.51 
Possible approaches exist for determining the costs of wrongful 
convictions.  For example, data based on jury verdicts could be collected for 
wrongful conviction cases, where substantial civil judgments (some of them 
larger than the numbers just cited for victimizations52) have been entered in 
favor of those wrongfully convicted. 
 
 47  TED R. MILLER, MARC A. COHEN & BRIAN WIERSEMA, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, VICTIM 
COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK 9 tbl. 2 (1996). 
 48  Kathryn E. McCollister et al., The Cost of Crime to Society: New Crime-Specific 
Estimates for Policy and Program Evaluation, 108 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 98, 105 
tbl. 5 (2010); see also MILLER ET AL., supra note 47, at 9 tbl. 2 (using older data to conclude 
that loss per crime victimization can be quantified as $2,940,000 for a murder, $87,000 for a 
sexual assault, and $19,000 for a robbery with injury).  Cf. David A. Anderson, The Cost of 
Crime, 7 FOUND. & TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 209 (2012) (estimating total cost of crime 
in the U.S. at $3.2 trillion, more than total health care costs).  Similar figures from those 
quoted in the text come from the RAND Center on Quality Policing, which calculates a cost 
per murder of $8,649,216, per rape of $217,866, per aggravated assault of $87,238, and per 
robbery of $67,277.  Paul Heaton, Hidden in Plain Sight: What Cost-of-Crime Research Can 
Tell Us About Investing in Police, RAND CTR. ON QUALITY POLICING (2010), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP279.pdf.  
 49  LAUDAN, supra note 2, at 77.   
 50  LAUDAN, supra note 2, at 77.   
 51  See generally Darryl Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 
323 (2004). 
 52  Cf. Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
(and a Critique of the Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1037–41 
(2004) (discussing cost-benefit analysis in federal sentencing based on victimization figures).   
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Another approach might be to look at exoneree-compensation systems 
that have been put in place in various jurisdictions for the wrongfully 
convicted.53  For example, a federal statute provides $50,000 for each year 
spent in the federal system wrongfully incarcerated ($100,000 for each year 
on death row), while various states provide yearly compensation ranging 
from $5,000 per year to $80,000 per year.54  Other states provide lump sum 
payments, which can range from $20,000 to several hundred thousand 
dollars.55  These figures might be used to help calculate a cost of wrongful 
conviction, and then a further quantitative refinement of the tradeoffs 
discussed above would then be possible.56 
But one other important factor might also need to be entered into the 
calculation: The general moral culpability of those who have been 
wrongfully convicted versus those who have been victims of crime.  While 
the innocence literature does not highlight the fact, most of those wrongfully 
convicted had apparently committed other crimes – either at the time of the 
crime for which they were wrongfully convicted or earlier – and the previous 
crime was often associated with the wrongful conviction.  For example, prior 
arrests can produce police photographs that can end up in a photospread to 
be misidentified.  Or prior crimes may incorrectly arouse the suspicion of 
police detectives. 
One prominent illustration of how the wrongfully convicted may have 
some moral culpability is Anthony Porter.  He was convicted of committing 
a drug-related homicide in Washington Park on the south side of Chicago.  
But it was apparently difficult for him to present a defense to that charge, 
because he may have been committing an armed robbery in another part of 
the park at the same time.  He ran from the park, gun in hand, in full view of 
witnesses.  Porter then denied not only the murder, but also being in the park 
– a lie he maintained until after his convictions were affirmed.57 
 
 53  See Erik Encarnacion, Backpay for Exonerees, 29 YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES 245 
(2017); Robert J. Norris, Exoneree Compensation: Current Policies and Future Outlook, in 
WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 289 (Marvin 
Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 2014).  
 54  Norris, supra note 53, at 291.   
 55  Norris, supra note 53, at 291. 
 56  Cf. Cassell, supra note 52, at 1037–41 (discussing cost-benefit analysis in federal 
sentencing based on victimization figures).   
 57  See Marquis, supra note 2, at 517.  Whether Porter was in fact innocent has been called 
into doubt by a new documentary movie, A Murder in the Park.  The documentary investigates 
the fact that Porter was released after a Medill Innocence Project investigation obtained a 
confession from Alstory Simon to the murder—a confession that led to Porter’s exoneration 
and Simon’s incarceration. But later Simon’s murder conviction was overturned, in part 
because of the Innocence Project’s coercive investigative tactics had tainted the case against 
Simon.  See Jim Stingl, Duped by Medill Innocence Project, Milwaukee Man Now Free, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (NOV. 6, 2014), http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/duped-
by-innocence-project-milwaukee-man-now-free-b99386015z1-281852841.html. 
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The prevalence of criminal activity by those wrongfully convicted is 
suggested by a case I recently worked on involving an alleged wrongful 
conviction of Robert Wilcoxson.58  The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry 
Commission found Wilcoxson to be innocent of a drug-related murder.  But 
it appears that one reason he fell under suspicion was that, at the time of the 
murder, he was (by his own admission) an armed cocaine dealer making tens 
of thousands of dollars in the illegal drug trade.59  Four other adults also fell 
under suspicion and were also convicted, wrongfully they have argued.  Still, 
it appears that they may have all have been involved in doing a series of 
armed robberies at around the same time.60  Thus, in this one case, possibly 
involving multiple wrongful convictions, it appears that all five of the 
allegedly wrongfully convicted participants were involved in other 
dangerous crimes apart from the murder for which they were convicted, 
which made it harder for them to convince authorities of their innocence. 
Professor Findley discusses the point about prior convictions in his 
article, noting that “while wrongful conviction can happen to anyone, those 
with a prior record are at a significantly higher risk of suffering such an 
injustice; the rate of exoneration is almost 50 percent higher for those with a 
criminal record than for those without.”61  Findley’s suspicions are supported 
by data from the National Registry of Exonerations.  In a recent preliminary 
tabulation (2017), when the registry had collected 2,101 exonerations—and 
a total of 1,536 cases with reported data on prior records—647 (42%) had a 
prior felony conviction, 163 (11%) had a prior misdemeanor conviction, 30 
(2%) had a prior juvenile felony conviction, and 13 (1%) had a prior juvenile 
misdemeanor conviction.62  These numbers may be slightly on the low side, 
since it is possible that the data collected missed some prior convictions 
known to police.63  And it may be easier for a person without a prior 
conviction to obtain an exoneration (and thus listing in the registry) than one 
 
 58  Disclosure: I served as an expert witness for law enforcement officers involved in the 
civil litigation that resulted from this case, and have served as a similar expert witness in other 
similar cases.   
 59  Deposition of Robert Wilcoxson, Wilcoxson v. Buncombe Cty. et al., 129 F. Supp. 3d 
308 (W.D.N.C. 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-00224-MR-DSC).   
 60  Testimony of Damian Mills to N.C. Innocence Inquiry Comm’n, Dec. 18, 2013, at 
481–82 (saying that he had been doing a series of breaking-and-enterings with Kagonyera, 
Williams, Isbell, and Brewton).   
 61  Findley, supra note 27, at 1283; see also Jon B. Gould et al., Predicting Erroneous 
Convictions, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471, 492 (2014) (finding that prior criminal history influence 
case outcome in wrongful convictions cases).   
 62  Email from Samuel R. Gross, Thomas & Mabel Long Professor of Law, University of 
Michigan Law, to author (Sept. 30, 2017) (on file with author).  These numbers are for the 
highest prior in each category—i.e., a person with a felony conviction may also have 
misdemeanor convictions.   
 63  See id. (noting this limitation, but estimating that that the difference might be in the 
range of an additional 1 to 2%).   
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with.64  But the general picture of significant prior criminal activity by the 
wrongfully convicted is clear.  And, more broadly, most defendants who 
stand trial have a criminal record that predates the charged crime.65 
The point here is not to blame those wrongfully convicted for their 
plight.  The more limited theme is that, when assessing the priority to be 
given to competing claims between those wrongfully convicted and those 
who are past (or prospective) crime victims, the victims may have a far 
stronger claim, at least in the aggregate.  Some support for this position 
comes from a study reporting that, for homicide and assault cases, the 
majority of the victims had no prior arrest record, while the majority of the 
offenders did.66 
A related point can be made about the wrongfully convicted who have 
pled guilty.  Unless the defendant has entered an Alford plea (refusing to 
plead guilty but preserving his position of innocence),67 he has almost 
certainly committed perjury in entering his plea.  Consider, for example, 
Robert Wilcoxson and Kenneth Kagonyera.68  At their guilty plea hearings, 
both swore under oath that they were guilty, that they were satisfied with 
defense counsel, and that the other requisites for a knowing and voluntary 
guilty plea existed.  So far as the court records reveal, they also made no 
effort to enter an Alford plea. In addition, following Kagonyera’s decision to 
plead guilty, he met with the prosecutor and, in the presence of defense 
counsel made a very detailed statement about his involvement in the murder, 
 
 64  I am indebted to Sam Gross for this point.   
 65  Jeffrey Bellin, The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395, 399 (2017) (citing BRIAN 
A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE 
URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES 8, 10–11 (Dec. 2013), https://ww
w.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf (reporting that 75% of suspects charged with a felony 
had a prior arrest, 60% had a prior felony arrest; 60% had at least one prior conviction; and 
43% had at least one prior felony conviction)); Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking 
a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify 
and Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1371 tbl. 1 (2009) (study of felony trials in 
four jurisdictions found 76% of the defendants standing trial had some kind of criminal 
record); Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 781, 786–90 & tbl. 1 (1979) (not reporting percentage but instead 
providing statistic of an average of 2.7 prior convictions per defendant and that “most 
defendants had prior convictions”); see also HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE 
AMERICAN JURY 33 n.1 & 145 (2d ed. 1971) (stating in 47% of the trials in their sample from 
1954-1955, the defendant had a prior record).   
 66  See Arnite A. Varnedoe, Characteristics of Offenders Arrested for Aggravated 
Assault: A Test of Easterlin’s Hypothesis 8–9 (May 1, 1987) (thesis, Atlanta University) (on 
file with the AUC Robert W. Woodruff Library), http://digitalcommons.auctr.edu/cgi/viewc
ontent.cgi?article=3091&context=dissertations. 
 67  See generally Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive Criminal Law Values & 
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford & Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361 
(2003); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV.  1117, 1166 (2008).  
 68  See N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM’N, State v. Kagonyera /Wilcoxson, http://innocen
cecommission-nc.gov/cases/state-v-kagonyera-wilcoxson/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2018).  
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implicating five other people.69  Kagonyera made these statements at his own 
initiative in an effort to convince the District Attorney that he could provide 
useful information by testifying against his co-defendants.70 
To be clear, if Kagonyera and Wilcoxson were in fact innocent,71 their 
guilty pleas were plainly wrongful convictions.  And no doubt, their pleas 
resulted from a plea bargaining process that can be coercive and place 
considerable pressure on even innocent persons to plead guilty—making the 
choice of an innocent person to plead guilty in some sense rational.72  But 
particularly where defendants (like Kagonyera and Wilcoxson) have made 
no effort to enter Alford pleas,73 a decision to mislead the Court by pleading 
guilty produces a wrongful conviction that is, to some extent, the result of 
illegal choices on their part and therefore entitled to somewhat less weight 
in social harm calculus.74 
I would like to see more discussion of and data on these questions, and 
particularly the extent to which the wrongfully convicted had prior criminal 
records or were participating in crimes at the time of the offense for which 
they were wrongfully convicted.  (Similar data on victims would be 
interesting too.)  But the critical point here is that Laudan’s basic calculations 
require a much more searching analysis before we can simply assume a cost 
ratio of 1.2 to 2.2 between wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals.  
And without such an analysis, Laudan cannot be said to have carried his 
burden of proving that his new proposal would be a desirable change. 
B. Distinguishing Guilty from Innocent Suspects 
While Laudan’s proposal may be flawed, it can usefully serve as a 
vehicle for thinking more broadly about tradeoffs involved with wrongful 
convictions.  Indeed, Laudan has provided a useful graphical depiction of 
how we might evaluate competing concerns in Figure 1 in his article, which 
depicts a set of two bell curves – one for the innocent and one for the guilty.  
The x-axis is the level of apparent guilt and the y-axis is the risk of error.75 
 
 69  Memorandum from Investigator Raymond to Dist. Attorney Moore (Nov. 30, 2001) 
(memorializing Kenneth Kagonyera’s statements made on Nov. 29, 2001) (on file with 
author).   
 70  Kagonyera Dep. 134–35:LINE#s, Jan. 9, 2015, ECF No.  (admitting this fact).   
 71  The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission has found both men to be factually 
innocent.   
 72  Compare Bowers, supra note 67, with Stephanos Bibas, Exacerbating Injustice, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53, 54 (2008) (responding to Bowers). 
 73  Currently about 47 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system authorize 
Alford pleas.  See Bibas, supra note 67, at 1372–73 n.52.  However, the extent to which such 
pleas are effectively available in day-to-day plea negotiations is unclear.   
 74  It is also possible that they choose to plead guilty to the murder because they were 
guilty of other serious, violent crimes.  See supra notes and accompanying text.   
 75  To avoid confusing readers, I will follow conventional Cartesian nomenclature and 
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One Bell curve—in blue—depicts the distribution of the apparent guilt of 
guilty criminals.  Because these persons are, in fact, guilty, this curve is 
centered on the right side of the y-axis, toward the guilty end.  Laudan then 
depicts a burden of proof for conviction—the beyond a reasonable doubt 
burden—which Laudan assumes is 96% apparent guilt.  Drawing a vertical 
line through the Bell curve leaves a substantial area to the left—those guilty 
persons for whom evidence is insufficient to obtain a conviction, i.e., the 
false acquittals. 
The second Bell curve—in red—depicts the distribution of the apparent 
guilt of innocent suspects.  Because these suspects are, in fact, innocent, this 
curve is centered on the left side of the y-axis, toward the innocent end.  
Unfortunately, of course, some persons who are innocent may appear to be 
somewhat guilty.  And, indeed, some innocent persons will be so apparently 
guilty that they will fall to the right of vertical line at the 96% level of 
apparent guilt.  These are the wrongfully convicted – the innocents who 
suffer in Blackstone’s terms. 
One note about the relative sizes of the two shaded areas.  The relative 
sizes show the ratio of the guilty who escape versus the innocent who suffer.  
For example, if we limit the issue to cases covered by Laudan’s figure76 and 
if the criminal justice system is operating at the Blackstonian 10:1 ratio, then 
the blue area will be ten times larger than the red area.  Of course, if the ratios 
are much larger, then the blue should be much larger as well. 
Laudan’s blue (wrongful acquittal) area is vastly larger than his red 
(wrongful conviction) area, even though in some of his writing he appears to 
suggest that the current system is operating, more dangerously, at below the 
10:1 ratio.  For example, in his appendix to this symposium piece, with 
respect to violent crimes, Laudan quantifies the number of false positives 
(assuming a 3% error rate) at 10,900 and the number of false negatives at 
80,000, a ratio of about 7.3:1.77  Accordingly, if his charts are going to be 
 
refer to Laudan’s horizontal axis as the x-axis and vertical axis as the y-axis.   
 76  Laudan’s figure appears to be limited to all persons arrested for various crimes.  Of 
course, many arrested and guilty persons will never be successfully prosecuted, not because 
they will be wrongfully acquitted at trial, but because prosecutors will simply dismiss the case 
before it proceeds to trial.  See infra notes and accompanying text.  These persons are 
nonetheless properly included in Laudan’s blue shaded area, because the burden of proof (and 
other factors) presumably have led prosecutors to be unwilling or unable to successfully 
pursue conviction.  More broadly, however, Laudan’s graph fails to capture many cases that 
involve the guilty escaping prosecution, such as cases in which various procedural rules apart 
from the burden of proof prevent successful prosecution.  The Miranda case may provide a 
prime example of such rules.  See generally Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still 
Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful 
Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REV. 685 (2017).   
 76  Laudan, supra note 1.   
 77  Id. at 1253, ix.   
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link to his empirical data, the ratio of his blue area to red area should be 7.3:1, 
not the roughly 50:1 ratio that the chart depicts. 
Laudan’s x-axis is also unevenly labelled. It does not appear that he is 
using a logarithmic scale for apparent guilt, and so the intervals on the x-axis 
should be placed consistently at 10% intervals – from 10% to 20% to 
30% . . . to 90% to 100%, etc.  Laudan does not appear to have done this, for 
reasons that are unexplained. 
Laudan also appears to have haphazardly labelled his y-axis as “risk of 
verdicts based upon error.”  The y-axis has nothing to do with risk of error. 
Instead, the y-axis is simply number of defendants – i.e., number of guilty 
defendants depicted in the blue curve, and number of innocent defendants 
depicted in the red curve. 
With those quibbles aside, one more point becomes important – the 
relative size of the blue curve and the red curve.  Laudan has both curves 
covering the same total area – which means, apparently, that the criminal 
justice system is processing the same number of guilty persons as innocent 
persons.  In fact, however, when measured at any point beyond the earliest 
stages of criminal investigation, the number of guilty persons will vastly 
exceed the number of innocent persons. 
One of the problems with Laudan’s graph is that it assumes a static 
amount of evidence available to police and prosecutors in the criminal justice 
system.78 Given fixed evidence concerning innocent and guilty suspects, the 
only way to address the problem of false negatives is to change the burden 
of proof – which inevitably produces the tradeoffs captured in the Blackstone 
ratio – the “deadly dilemmas” that Laudan (and Allen) have written about so 
powerfully.  But now, as a thought experiment, consider some sort of a 
change to police investigative procedures that gives police greater insight 
into the crimes and suspects who come to their attention.  Assume, for 
example, that every police officers becomes equipped with an effective 
crystal ball, into which the officer could gaze and have, quantitatively 
speaking, ten percent more evidence about any particular crime.  The net 
effect would be not to change the size of the either of the two Bell curves – 
the curve for the guilty or the curve for the innocent.  The police would 
continue to have the same number guilty and innocent suspects under 
investigation. Instead, because the police would now have more evidence 
about any particular suspect, the apparent guilt of the guilty suspects 
increases – moving that curve to the right.  And the apparent innocence of 
 
 78  Professor Findley has identified this assumption as a problem with Laudan’s article as 
well.  See Findley, supra note 27, at 1272 (Laudan’s proposal to change the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard “does nothing to affect the production, access to, and presentation 
of evidence, which likely represent much more significant variables in determining both the 
prevalence and distribution of error.”).   
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the innocence suspect also increases – moving that curve to the left. 
The key effect is changes to the two shaded areas.  The crystal ball’s 
net effect is to both reduce the number of guilty suspects escaping justice 
and reduce the number of innocent suspect suffering punishment – the 
proverbial “win-win” solution.  The key insight to the thought experiment is 
that, because the police have more evidence, they are simultaneously able 
both to punish more guilty suspects and to avoid punishing more innocent 
persons. 
One way of putting it is that such reforms increase the “diagnosticity” 
of the system—that is, its ability to distinguish between guilty and innocent 
persons.  Professor Risinger helpfully explained this point, explaining that 
reform measures for addressing wrongful convictions can be divided into 
two categories with different moral implications: Some reforms improve the 
diagnosticity of the system, thereby reducing the incidence of both wrongful 
convictions and wrongful acquittals.  Such reforms—along with reforms that 
protect the innocent without no reduction in convictions of the guilty—
should be relatively uncontroversial, because (as Laudan aptly puts it) 
Blackstone would be much happier.  On the other hand, some reforms 
increase the protections for the innocent but do so at the expense of freeing 
more guilty persons—reforms that are controversial precisely because of the 
tradeoff involved.79 
The reader at this point may agree with the thought experiment and 
related claims as far as they go.  But the reader may quickly wonder whether 
this thought experiment has any real world applications. 
One straightforward application is DNA testing capabilities.  Consider, 
using Figure 2, how DNA testing changed the two Bell curves in rape cases. 
Before DNA testing was available, blood testing might have been able to 
compare physical evidence left at the scene of the crime with that of a suspect 
and narrow things down with to, let’s say, 10% of the population.  For a 
guilty suspect, that would mean that the jury would have a high degree of 
confidence in his guilt, but perhaps not enough to return a guilty verdict 
(without other evidence).  For an innocent suspect, that means a risk of an 
erroneous conviction, if other evidence (incorrectly) pointed to his guilt.  
After the arrival of DNA testing, the curve for the guilty suspects moved to 
the right—their apparent guilt increased with a positive test.  And the curve 
for the innocent suspects moved to the left—the testing reduced the apparent 
guilt of more innocent suspects through greater discrimination. 
 
 
 
 79  D. Michael Risinger, The Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to 
Allen and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 991, 1001 (2010). 
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So what is the takeaway from this though experiment?  Some readers 
may say that this proves no more than that we should continue searching for 
improved crime detection technologies, which are good things for both 
convicting the guilty and ensuring that the innocent are not punished.  But I 
want to suggest that opportunities for protecting the innocent are more 
generally available than has been generally appreciated.  In fact, we have 
many quite reasonable opportunities for shifting the innocence Bell curve to 
the left – without also moving the guilty Bell curve to the left – opportunities 
that should be endorsed by those who truly come at criminal justice reform 
from an innocentric perspective.80  Indeed, Laudan’s proposal itself can be 
reconfigured slightly to produce at least some improvements in 
diagnosticity. 
C. Extending Parole to Avoid Wrongful Acquittals 
So far I have criticized Laudan’s proposal.  But Laudan’s proposal is 
not without its uses.  First, Laudan exhibits considerable courage—both in 
this symposium and elsewhere—in forcing those concerned about innocence 
issues to think carefully about the arguments that they are raising.  Too often, 
advocates of innocent reforms have not thought through the countervailing 
concerns.  Laudan’s proposal forces an explicit consideration of the 
competing values. 
More important, the basic thrust of Laudan’s proposal can be salvaged 
with a few “friendly amendments” to it.  With some tweaks, it would be 
possible for Laudan to present a fully constitutional proposal that would have 
strong arguments for producing a favorable cost-benefit calculation. 
Turning first to the constitutional problem, as discussed earlier,81 
Laudan’s frontal assault on the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for 
criminal trials is plainly unconstitutional under current doctrine.  But because 
Laudan is attempting to change the burdens of proof not for all accused 
criminals, but only for a subset—those with a prior felony conviction for a 
crime of violence82—his proposal can be reconfigured to survive 
constitutional scrutiny.  The reconfiguration relies on the fact that if the 
previously-convicted felon is still on parole at that time he is accused of the 
 
 80  For thoughtful discussion of such issues, see Keith A. Findley, Toward A New 
Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control and Due 
Process, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133 (2008). 
 81  See supra notes and accompanying text.   
 82  Laudan is somewhat imprecise in defining the group for whom his proposal applies, 
referring to “serial felons charged with a crime.”  Laudan, supra note 1, at 1244.  For greater 
precision, I will refer specifically to persons with a previous felony for conviction for a crime 
of violence.  The term “crime of violence” has been subject to considerable adjudication in 
recent years and bears a precise meaning in many federal and state criminal codes.  See, e.g., 
18 U.S.C. § 16 (1984) (defining “crime of violence”).   
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new crime, the felon’s parole could be revoked—and the felon sent back to 
prison—without a full blown trial under the conventional beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard.  The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that parole revocation proceedings are quite different from 
ordinary criminal prosecutions and thus the “full panoply of rights due a 
defendant [at trial] . . . does not apply to parole revocations.”83  It is well 
settled that a “criminal prosecution—governed by the reasonable doubt 
standard—and a parole revocation hearing are two very different 
proceedings.  In the latter, the Government’s ‘burden of proof’ is 
considerably less.”84 
Against that backdrop, it would be possible to obtain most of the 
benefits of Laudan’s proposal by simply converting it to a parole revocation 
proposal.  Here is one way that such a proposal could be operationalized: 
 
 83   Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480. 
 84   Villarreal v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 985 F.2d 835, 839 (5th Cir. 1993); see Pierce v. 
State, Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 646 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Wash. 1982) (“Violation of 
conditions of parole need not be established beyond reasonable doubt. All that is required is 
that the Board be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the parolee has breached 
a condition under which he was granted parole.”).   
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CASSELL PAROLE EXTENSION PROPOSAL 
 
1. Any person convicted of a violent felony shall, in addition to any 
punishment currently provided, be placed on a term of parole for 
an additional ten years after his release from custody.  The 
conditions of the term of parole shall, at a minimum, require that 
the person not commit any new violent crime in violation of any 
federal, state, or local law. 
 
2. Upon a credible allegation that a person has committed a new 
violent crime in violation of the terms of parole, the person shall 
be tried at a parole revocation hearing.  The person shall 
generally receive the protections provided at a criminal trial, 
including the right to be notified of the charges in writing, 
advance notice of the evidence against him, an opportunity to be 
heard in person and through counsel regarding the charges, and 
opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses (except for 
good cause shown), and a decision by a neutral and detached 
decision-maker.  However, the parole revocation determination 
will be made under the clear and convincing evidence standard. 
 
3. During the period of parole, the person on parole shall be subject 
to search (and his premises subject to search) upon an articulated 
ground of suspicion. 
 
4. During the period of parole, the person on parole may be subject 
to reasonable questioning without prior delivery of Miranda 
warnings.  
 
5. All other criminal penalties for violent crimes shall be reduced 
by 5% [or such other amount as is required to keep the proposal 
“punishment neutral”—i.e., so that the number of persons in 
prison for violent crimes does not change due to the enactment 
of this proposal].  
 
6. The existence of this program shall be widely announced 
through mass media and in other ways.  
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This parole-expansion proposal would require that, after any violent 
felon’s release from prison, he would be placed on parole for ten years and 
could be sent back to prison if he violated that parole by committing a  new 
violent crime—a violation that would be adjudicated under a clear and 
convincing standard of evidence, just as Laudan proposes.85  As just 
discussed, at parole revocation hearings, a clear and convincing standard of 
proof is plainly constitutionally permissible—indeed, most state parole 
proceedings are resolved under the lower preponderance of the evidence 
standard.86  The proposal also provides those accused of violating parole with 
the constitutionally-required due process safeguards specified by the 
Supreme Court.87 
To be sure, the parole-expansion proposal would only apply for the 
additional ten years after release from prison rather than the (apparently) 
lifetime application that Laudan’s proposal envisions.  But given that violent 
criminals tend to “age out” of criminal activity over time,88 an additional ten-
year period of parole would likely capture the vast bulk of the crime-
prevention benefits of Laudan’s proposal. 
This proposal also should help improve the diagnosticity of the 
investigation of crimes, at least to some degree.  The proposal allows the 
state to search a parolee or his premises upon some minimal articulated 
suspicion.  The Supreme Court has already upheld suspicionless searches of 
parolees as constitutional.89  This proposal goes a bit beyond what is 
constitutionally required, by requiring some articulated reason for the search.  
And, more important, in allowing police to quickly search parolees and their 
premises,90 the proposal should produce more physical evidence of crimes—
 
 85  Because the proposal is triggered by allegations of new crime, it is not fairly 
characterized as a “preventive detention” proposal.  For thoughtful discussion of issues 
surrounding preventative detention, see Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas 
III: Some Kind Words for Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 781 (2011).   
 86  See, e.g., People v. Abrams, 158 Cal. App. 4th 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); State v. 
Harris, No. S0200CR201400075, 2016 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 388 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 2016); 
Romero v. People, 179 P.3d 984 (Colo. 2007); Russell v. State, 982 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 2008); 
People ex rel. Matthews v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 447 N.E.2d 689 (N.Y. 1983); Ex parte 
Doan, 369 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); State v. Maestas, 997 P.2d 314 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2000); State v. Brown, 140 A.3d 768 (R.I. 2016).   
 87  See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). 
 88  See, e.g., Michael Massoglia & Christopher Uggen, Settling Down and Aging Out: 
Toward an Interactionist Theory of Desistance and Transition to Adulthood, 116 AM. J. SOC. 
543 (2010).   
 89  Sampson v. California, 843 U.S. 547, 857 (2006) (“the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit a police officers from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee”).   
 90  Searches of parolees’ premises does present concerns about invading the privacy of 
third persons.  Tracing out these competing concerns is beyond the scope of this article.  But 
these concerns could be addressed in other ways.  For example, the parolee might be required 
to give notice (as is often done currently) to other occupants of his residence of the existence 
of this search condition.  If this is deemed inadequate protection for third parties, perhaps the 
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evidence that would help sort out the guilty from the innocent.91 
The proposal also helps to collect more statements from potential 
criminal suspects, by allowing the government to questioning parolees 
without Miranda warnings.  Here again, this approach is entirely consistent 
with current caselaw, which recognizes that convicted criminals under the 
supervision of the government may be subject to questioning in various ways 
without triggering Miranda obligations.92 
The parole-expansion proposal would thus increase the evidence 
available to the government during investigating phases of the criminal 
justice system with regard to a particularly dangerous group of suspects: 
previously-convicted violent felons.  Like newly-discovered DNA 
technology, expanded evidence collection should help distinguish the guilty 
from the innocent.  The proposal can obviously be criticized as reducing the 
liberties enjoyed by convicted violent felons.  But because this program 
would be widely advertised in advance, it seems reasonable to respond that 
such objections are entitled to little weight – the convicted violent felon, after 
all, would have made a conscious choice to forfeit those liberties. 
And what about moving adjudication of crimes away from criminal 
trials employing beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standards and instead deciding 
them in parole hearings with mere clear-and-convincing standards?  Here 
some quantification of the competing risk become important.  With regard 
to the criminal justice system currently, the tradeoffs appear to be already 
tipped decidedly in favor of the accused rather than the prosecution.  This 
would seem to be a strong argument that some modest change in the burden 
of proof could be possible without unfairly tipping the balance in the 
government’s favor.  Indeed, one of the most curious features of Laudan’s 
argument in favor of his proposal is that he rests it entirely on the relative 
harms of a wrongful acquittal versus a wrongful conviction, the 1.2 versus 
2.2 calculus that he derives.  But in building from that foundation, Laudan 
has seemingly forfeited his strongest argument from his earlier research: that, 
measured in percentage terms, relatively few innocent persons are 
wrongfully convicted when compared to those victimized by violent 
criminals.93 
 
government’s use of an incriminating evidence discovered during such a search could be 
limited to the parolee himself.   
 91  See infra notes and accompanying text (discussing this issue at greater length).   
 92  See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984) (“The general obligation to 
appear before his probation officer and answer questions truthfully did not in itself convert 
respondent’s otherwise voluntary statements into compelled one.”).  For further discussion of 
Miranda and wrongful convictions, see infra notes and accompanying text.  
 93   See Cassell, Overstating America’s Wrongful Conviction Rate?, supra note 14.  
Again, to make clear, each wrongful conviction is an undeniable tragedy for the person who 
suffers the wrongful conviction.   
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Offering an economic perspective on Laudan’s proposal, Professor 
Roger Koppl’s thoughtful contribution to this symposium appears to 
overlook this point.  Koppl criticizes Laudan’s proposal as hinging, to some 
degree, on the estimate of a 3% overall error in the criminal justice system.94  
But the 3% figure, while alluded to in Laudan’s paper (by cross-reference to 
his earlier work), is not actually part of his calculation. 
More broadly, in Koppl’s view, this 3% error rate figure is too low, 
although the only additional evidence he offers on this point is a jury verdict 
replication study from England that is more than forty years old.95  The study 
Koppl relies upon involved “shadow juries” who considered the same 
evidence that real juries did, ultimately reaching differing conclusions than 
the real jury in about one out of eight (12.5%) of all cases.  Because 12.5% 
is much higher than 3%, Koppl concludes that the 3% figure is “too 
conservative.”96  But even granting that that we might find something like a 
12.5% “error rate” by comparing differing outcomes from two different 
juries, that differing-outcome rate tells us little about a wrongful conviction 
rate, a point Koppl himself is careful to flag.97  Unless Koppl can show that 
the juries were considering cases in which a defendant was factually innocent 
(a proof he does not attempt to make), disagreement over whether the 
prosecution carried the high burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt proves little about innocence issues. 
Koppl also offers his qualitative assessment that the 3% rate is too low, 
noting quite properly that the earlier research (by Risinger and Gross) upon 
which the 3% figure relies might be understated through failure to include 
all of the wrongful convictions in the samples at issue.98  But as Koppl 
properly acknowledges,99 there is also the possibility that the samples from 
which these figures were drawn (involving high stakes capital murder 
prosecutions) might not be typical of the American criminal justice system.  
This point provides strong reason for thinking that, as a measure of the 
overall error rate in the American criminal justice system, the 3% figure is 
in fact far too high.100 
 
 94  Roger Koppl, Comment on Laudan.  
 95  Id. (citing SARAH MCCABE & ROBERT PURVES, THE SHADOW JURY AT Work (1974)); 
see also Roger Koppl & Megan Sacks, The Criminal Justice System Creates Incentives for 
False Convictions, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 126, 131-32 (2013) (discussing McCabe and Purves 
study). 
 96  Koppl, supra note 94. 
 97  See id. (“This figure is an average overall error rate for the study and not a rate of false 
convictions”).   
 98  Id.   
 99  Id.  
 100  Professor Thomas and I both explore the subject of the wrongful conviction rate in 
three recent separate articles, all of which provide a wrongful conviction rate well below 3%.  
See supra note 14.   
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Professor Gross has explained the reason for thinking that capital 
murder cases might produce higher error rates, noting that in murder cases 
there is “extraordinary pressure to secure convictions for heinous crimes” as 
well as the difficult of investigating crimes without victims available to 
testify.101  Police also devote tremendous resources to solving murder cases, 
unlike other crimes of violence.102  The net result of these factors may well 
be that the risk of a wrongful conviction is, somewhat paradoxically, greater 
for more serious crimes than for less serious crimes. 
Such risk factors for wrongful conviction are absent in typical criminal 
investigations for less serious (and more prevalent) violent crimes.  The 
criminology literature persuasively documents that even serious reported 
crimes often receive only superficial attention from investigators.103  If 
information uniquely identifying the perpetrator is unavailable when the 
crime is first reported, the perpetrator by and large will never be 
subsequently identified.104  Generally speaking, “if a suspect is neither 
known to the victim nor arrested at the scene of the crime, the chances of 
ever arresting him are very slim.”105  One widely-cited study reported that 
for ten aggravated assault cases, all ten were solved by “routine initial ID” 
and none were solved by more extended techniques such as a picture ID 
lineup, interrogation, finger prints, or other investigation106—the types of 
complex investigations that can produce wrongful convictions.  A much 
larger sample of cases in Kansas found that of aggravated assault cases which 
we solved, 94% were solved through such routine initial identification.107 
The fact that the aggravated assault cases police solve are solved 
rapidly helps paint of picture of what typical cases prosecuted in the criminal 
justice system look like.  They are probably bar room fights or escalating 
domestic violence situations, where determining “who dunnit” is not the 
question.  Taking error rates from complex rape-murder investigations and 
applying them to these kinds of simple cases will invariably and significant 
overstate the number of wrongful convictions. 
 
 
 101   See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 through 2003, 95 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 532 (2005) 
 102   Id. at 542.   
 103  JOHN E. ECK, SOLVING CRIMES: THE INVESTIGATION OF BURGLARY AND ROBBERY 16 
(1983).   
 104  Id.  (citing Peter W. Greenwood & Joan Petersilia, THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
PROCESS – VOLUME 1: SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (Rand 1975)).   
 105  PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK 
FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 8 (1967).   
 106   Peter W. Greenwood, Jan M. Chaiken, Joan Petersilia & Linda Prusoff, 3 THE 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS: OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS 66-77 (1975).   
 107   Id. at 77.   
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To take one illustration of this point, consider manslaughter cases—i.e., 
cases in which the defendant concedes that he killed the victim but argues 
that he was provoked or was acting self-defense.  In such cases, the wrongful 
conviction rate—specifically the “wrong man” conviction rate—is 0.00%.  
Thus, just as Risinger was able to compute an error rate for a “significant 
subset of cases” in the criminal justice system (capital rape-murder cases in 
the 1980s),108 it is possible to even more precisely calculate an error rate for 
a much larger number of cases: manslaughter cases, where the error rate is 
0.00% and the factually innocent run no risk at all.  This “subset” of cases 
vastly outnumbers the subset Risinger was examining.  By some measures, 
manslaughter convictions are about as frequent as murder convictions109 (and 
capital murder convictions are, of course, a tiny fraction of all murder 
convictions). 
Stranger crimes (like the ones Risinger was examining) are far and 
away the most likely areas for wrongful convictions.110  For example, the 
most common cause of wrongful convictions—eyewitness 
misidentification—is, according to Professor Gross, “almost entirely 
restricted to crimes committed by strangers.”111  In contrast, most aggravated 
assaults are not committed by strangers.  And even among the “stranger” 
cases in aggravated assault cases, “who dunnit” issues will not always be 
present—such as when a drunken man at a bar gets in a fight and is tackled 
by the surrounding patrons.112 
In giving short shrift to such issues, Professor Koppl offers no sound 
reason to credit his speculation that the error rate in the American criminal 
justice system might be higher than 3%.  And, as an economist who has given 
paid close attention to costs and benefits in other important articles,113 it is 
somewhat surprising that here (perhaps due to the inherent brevity of 
symposium responses) he offers little discussion of the other side of the 
equation: the cost of wrongful acquittals and related victimization. 
 
 
 
 108  Risinger, supra note 6, at 767. 
 109  See SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND 
MANSLAUGHTER n.98 (1998). 
 110  See Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, 5 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 927, 941 (2008) 
(raising this point).   
 111  Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 through 2003, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 530 (2005).   
 112  Many aggravated assault cases involve close quarters combat.  About 27% of 
aggravated assaults involve personal weapons such as hands, fists, and feet and 19% involved 
knives or other cutting instruments.  See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS 21 (2012).   
 113  See, e.g., Roger Koppl & Megan Sacks, The Criminal Justice System Creates 
Incentives for False Convictions, 32 CRIM. J. ETHICS 126 (2013).   
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My parole-extension proposal also provides for widespread publicity 
about the program’s existence.  From a public policy perspective, following 
prior announcement of the program, the “cost” to be assigned to a wrongful 
conviction might be somewhat diminished.  After all, a person must typically 
act with mens rea (a guilty mind) to commit a violent crime.  And someone 
who has made the deliberate choice to commit one violent crime might be 
said to have freely assumed the risk that he will be wrongfully convicted 
under a lower, clear-and-convincing evidence standard for a subsequent one.  
This is not to suggest, of course, that just because someone has been 
convicted of committing a violent crime they are fair game for being tossed 
into prison whenever the government wants.  But it is to say that, given the 
prior conviction at a time when the program’s existence has been widely-
publicized, the weight that society should assign to that person’s interest in 
avoiding wrongful conviction can be fairly regarded as somewhat 
diminished, at least when compared to the interest of that innocent persons 
have in avoiding violent victimization.114 
One final objection to Laudan’s proposal is also worth considering.  
Several commentators here (specifically Lillquist, Findley, and Zalman) 
have raised the specter of over-criminalization.115  These commentators 
believe that society too readily resorts to prisons rather than other means in 
its response to crime.  And, at least with regard to some of their broader 
critiques (such as their concerns about overbroad mandatory minimum 
sentences), I tend to agree with them.116 
But when applied to Laudan’s proposal, these critiques are (at least as 
articulated here) wide of the mark.  Laudan’s proposal is aimed not at 
increasing the severity of punishment but its certainty.  He is not proposing 
to punish convicted criminals more harshly, but rather simply to convict 
more criminals.  There is a wealth of literature demonstrating that deterrence 
effects stem primarily from the likelihood that a criminal will be punished.117  
And while there is a wealth of literature on what has been called 
“overcriminalization” in the American criminal justice system,118 that 
literature does not address the undeniable fact that criminals run an 
 
 114  Cf. Allen & Laudan, supra note 85, at 802 (““[W]e should be willing to impose a 
greater risk on the defendant in the case of a prospective harm than in the case of a harm that 
has already been done.”).   
 115  Zalman, supra note 6; Findley, supra note 27.   
 116   See, e.g., supra note 52; Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2010).   
 117  See JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 397–401 
(1985). 
 118  See, e.g., Paul Larkin, The Extent of America’s Overcriminalization Problem, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (May 9, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/report/the-extent-americas-overcri
minalization-problem.   
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extremely low risk of being punished when they commit a crime.  For 
example, while about six million violent crimes are committed each year, 
only about 113,000 violent criminals are sentenced each year.119  While 
Laudan’s proposal may not be the single most effective way to increase the 
risk of punishment for crime,120 it certainly attempts to take a modest step in 
that direction. 
But fully tracing out the relative costs and benefits of criminal sanctions 
is well beyond the scope of this symposium piece.  A simpler way to proceed 
is, therefore, to take a page from the idea of “revenue neutral” tax reforms 
and create a proposal that is punishment neutral.  The parole-extension 
proposal outlined above would involve a 5% reduction in penalties for first 
time offenders (or whatever higher or lower percentage might be required) 
so as to create prison space for repeat offenders.  The net effect would be no 
increase in punishment—but rather redirected punishment against Laudan’s 
“serial” offenders.  This might be expected to have some increased deterrent 
effect.121  And because of the enhanced evidence-gathering features of the 
proposal (e.g., the parole searchers and interviews) the proposal might be 
expected to increase the certainty of punishment, which (most criminologists 
agree) is a key to an effective criminal justice system.122 
Finally, the alert reader will note that while proposing a friendly 
amendment to Laudan’s proposal, I haven not referred to these ideas as “my” 
proposal.  I have simply tried to improve upon Laudan’s own proposal, 
starting from what appear to be his initial premises.  Before fully endorsing 
the idea, I would like to see what others think about the idea—including other 
participants in this Symposium.  But it does seem as though Laudan’s initial 
instinct—that certain measures could be appropriately targeted at repeat 
offenders—is a sound one that could be constitutionally and desirably 
implemented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 119  See Cassell, supra note 11, at 1079.   
 120  My own view on this subject is that modifying the Miranda rules seem likely to be the 
single best way of increasing the risk that criminals face of punishment when they commit a 
crime.  See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 76.   
 121  See Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of 
California’s Two-and Three- Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (2002). 
 122  See, e.g., Wilson & Hernstein, supra note 117, at 397–401.   
CASSELL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:26 AM 
1464 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1435 
III. AVOIDING THE TRADEOFFS BETWEEN WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND 
WRONGFUL ACQUITTALS 
So far, I have focused on tradeoffs that require some assessment of 
competing values—the benefit of avoiding a wrongful conviction versus the 
cost of a guilty criminal going free.  The possibility that most innocence 
reform measures come at the cost of significant tradeoffs cannot be 
overlooked.  One illustration of this point is reforms regarding eyewitness 
identification—one the most common causes of wrongful convictions.123  
Many of the reform measures to address the problem appear to carry with 
them not only the prospect of avoiding misidentifications but also of 
discouraging accurate identifications.124  More broadly, as Professor Chris 
Slobogin has noted, “[m]ost reformist energy has understandably been 
focused on reducing wrongful convictions, through improved interrogations 
techniques, and identification procedures, defense involvement in the 
investigative process, and the like.  Most of these reforms, however, could 
also increase wrongful acquittals . . . .”125 
For the second part of this article, rather than embark on what would be 
a complicated effort to precisely quantify tradeoffs for particular reforms, I 
would like to search for reforms that help protect the innocent without 
freeing the guilty126—reforms that ought to be relatively uncontroversial, at 
least for those (including some of the participants in this symposium) who 
prioritize innocence issues over other values in the criminal justice system.127  
Here I want to engage arguments advanced in this symposium by Professor 
 
 123  The National Registry of Exonerations listed “mistaken witness ID” as the third 
leading cause of wrongful convictions, trailing only perjury / false accusation and official 
misconduct.  % Exonerations By Contributing Factor, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS  
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContrib
FactorsByCrime.aspx#.   
 124  See Steven E. Clark, Blackstone and the Balance of Eyewitness Identification 
Evidence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 101 (2011); see also Laurie N. Feldman, The Unreliable Case 
Against the Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications: A Response to Judge Alex Kozinski, 34 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 493 (2016).  For a helpful summary of the reform possibilities in this 
area, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTION THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 248–52 (2011).   
 125  Chris Slobogin, Lesson from Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 699, 704 (2014); see 
also D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence Is Different: Taking Innocence 
into Account in Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 869, 898 (2012) 
(problems with eyewitness misidentification are hard to be address because they are “inherent 
in the phenomenon”).  
 126  I also search for reform that do not reduce punishment for the guilty.  Cf. Luna & 
Cassell, supra note 116, at 60–74 (arguing for reduction in mandatory minimum sentences, a 
reform that might not only shorten sentences for the guilty but also reduce pressure on 
innocent defendants to plead). 
 127  See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549 (2008). See 
generally DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND 
ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012). 
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Zalman, who claims to write from an “innocentric” position about such 
issues.  Like other thoughtful commentators, 128 Zalman agrees that it is 
important to consider both costs and benefits in advancing reform proposals.  
But Zalman gives inadequate attention to precisely how a conscientious 
policymaker might ultimately evaluate reform proposals, particularly when 
proceeding from an innocentric perspective. 
In this Part, I discuss two topics.  First, I propose a decision rule that 
might be useful for evaluating reforms proposed for addressing innocence 
issues.  Second, I apply that decision rule to a series of reforms—reform that 
appear to be “win-win” escapes from the competing tradeoffs. 
A. A Decision Rule for Considering Innocentric Criminal Justice 
Reform 
When considering whether to support or oppose a proposed reform to 
the criminal justice system, a lot may depend on the perspective that one 
adopts.  Directly linked to the wrongful conviction issues at hand, Professor 
Risinger has helpfully proffered the labels “Paleyites” and “Romillists” to 
designate two camps—based on the positions of the eighteenth-century 
proto-utilitarian Reverend William Paley and the nineteenth-century 
reformist Sir Samuel Romilly.129  As Risinger sees it, Paleyites tend to be 
concerned that that criminal justice reforms designed to protect the innocent 
will so hamper convicting the guilty as to be undesirable.  On the other hand, 
Romillists so strongly recoil from the horror of convicting the innocent that 
they are willing to see changes adopted even if they make convicting the 
guilty significantly more difficult.130 
But what if someone adopts an “innocentric” viewpoint on criminal 
justice?  Writing in this symposium, for example, Professor Zalman 
acknowledges the competing Paleyite/Romillist categories, but chooses 
instead to identify himself as writing from an “innocentric” perspective.131  
Perhaps he likes this label, because it allows him to seize the rhetorical moral 
high ground.  To contest Zalman’s perspective, would someone have to write 
from a “guilt-centric” perspective?  Risinger’s labels had the clear advantage 
of assigning to each side in the debate a respectable position, particularly 
since the Reverend Paley was, as Risinger points out, “a man of significant 
moral courage, an opponent of slavery, and a man who ruined his chances at 
a bishopric rather than stifle his criticisms of the way the rich had not lived 
 
 128  See, e.g., Findley, supra note 80, at 134 (arguing that the goals of convicting the guilty 
and protecting the innocent are not mutually exclusive). 
 129  Risinger, supra note 5, at 764.   
 130  See id.   
 131  Zalman, supra note 6. 
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up to their moral obligations to the poor.”132 
In fairness to Professor Zalman, he is able to point to the origins of his 
label in the influential work of Professor Daniel Medwed.133  Medwed 
argued that “innocentrism, while not manna from heaven, is a bipartisan 
(indeed, politically ‘centrist’) issue that deserves a prominent place on the 
menu of theoretical, doctrinal, and strategic options for those who work in 
the area of criminal justice.”134  While Medwed helpfully identified 
innocentrism as associated with the “centrality of issues related actual 
innocence in courtrooms, classrooms, and newsrooms,”135 he never provided 
a precise definition of the term. Of more importance for this article, Medwed 
never addressed what to do if the values associated with innocentrism 
conflicted with other values.  To the contrary, Medwed sought to downplay 
the possibility of conflict, writing that innocentrism “should have a 
significant place in [criminal justice] discourse, and it can do so in concert 
with other time-tested criminal law values.”136 
In picking up Medwed’s perspective, Zalman also fails to articulate 
precisely how an innocentrist would assess other values that might compete 
with innocence.  I am someone concerned about wrongful convictions – 
albeit one who is also concerned about the willingness of some innocence 
movement members to traffic in “faux science.”137  Accordingly, I want to 
sketch out a possible innocentric approach for evaluating reform proposals. 
Here is one way an innocentrist might proceed in evaluating a reform 
proposal: 
 
1. Does the proposal reduce the number of factually innocent 
persons who are wrongfully convicted? 
 
2. If so, does the proposal significantly reduce the number of 
guilty persons who are properly convicted.  If yes, the 
 
 132  D. Michael Risinger, The Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to 
Allen and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 991, 999 & n. 29 (2010).   
 133  See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549. See generally 
DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT 
ON THE INNOCENT (2012). 
 134   Medwed, supra note 7, at 1572.   
 135   Id. at 1549. 
 136   Id. at 1558.   
 137  See, e.g., United States v. Phillipos, 849 F.3d 464, 471–72 (1st Cir. 2017) (“the District 
Court considered competing analyses of the reliability of Dr. [Richard] Leo’s studies and 
found that there was ‘no indication that there is a body of reliable material that constitutes 
understanding in this area,’ and that ‘it would introduce the jury . . . to a kind of faux science 
to present Dr. Leo’s testimony’”), as clarified on denial of reh’g, No. 15-1716, 2017 WL 
3307482 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 683 (2018).  The competing analysis to which 
the First Circuit refers is my expert testimony for the prosecution. 
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innocentrist should determine whether the costs outweigh the 
benefits. If the costs are too high, then the proposal should be 
rejected.  But if not, for an innocentrist, a presumption should 
then arise in favor of the proposal. 
 
3. Do any competing values—such as constitutional requirements 
or other concerns—clearly outweigh the presumption in favor 
of the proposal that would otherwise protect the innocent. 
 
Of course, this formula does not resolve all issues about which reform 
proposals an innocentrist should adopt. Many disputes may arise, in 
particular, at the second step of this process.  For example, some 
innocentrists have proposed increasing the prosecution’s burden of proof 
from the current beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to (in certain cases) an-
absolute-certainty standard.138  While this change would certainly desirably 
decrease wrongful convictions, the proposal’s likely net effect would be to 
block conviction of virtually anyone tried under this standard.139  While 
many persons—including many innocentrists—would likely find this to be 
an unacceptably high cost, an innocentrist is certainly free to weigh the 
competing values as he or she sees fit. 
Even better than weighing tradeoffs, of course, would be to find 
reasonable reforms that do not interfere with successful prosecution, because 
then no tradeoff between protecting the innocent and convicting the guilty 
exists.140  A true innocentrist should generally be ready to quickly endorse 
such reforms.  But do any such plausible reforms exist? 
B. Reforms that True Innocentrists Should Endorse 
As Professor Zalman notes in his appraisal of my earlier articles, I have 
proposed a number of ideas for reforming the criminal justice system that are 
designed to reduce convictions of the innocent while increasing convictions 
of the guilty.  Zalman critiques my proposals,141 and, if I understand him 
 
 138  Tim Bakken, Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: Beyond the 
Adversarial System, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 547, 574-75 (2008).   
 139  See Cassell, supra note 9, at 1076-77; but cf. Keith A. Findley, Adversarial 
Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 923 (2012) 
(“Cassell is correct about [the higher standard impeding conviction], but only if jurors were 
to apply that high standard of proof rigorously and literally.”).   
 140  See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the 
Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 133, 
134 (2008) (arguing that the goals of convicting the guilty and protecting the innocent are not 
mutually exclusive). 
 141  Zalman seemingly attempts to strengthen his critique by leveling the ad hominem 
attack that my proposals “derive from a conservative, crime control model vision” of criminal 
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correctly, he cannot bring himself to fully endorse any of them.  Of course, 
Zalman is obviously free to reject my ideas.142  But as an examination of his 
objections will make clear, he does not do so due to innocentric concerns but 
 
justice” that would “depart from the present adversary system.”  Zalman, supra note 6.  This 
attack misses the mark.   
           First, while I have written several law review articles advancing (in specific contexts) 
“originalist” jurisprudence, such jurisprudence does not equate with being in favor of 
restricting defendants’ rights.  To the contrary, one of my first law review articles urged 
greater double jeopardy protections for criminal defendants to restore protections that had 
historically existed. See Paul G. Cassell,  The Rodney King Trials and the Double Jeopardy 
Clause: Some Observations on Original Meaning and the ACLU’s Schizophrenic Views of 
the Dual Sovereign Doctrine, 41 UCLA L. REV. 693 (1994) (arguing for expansion of Double 
Jeopardy protections for criminal defendants).  This was no mere academic exercise, as last 
year, I served as co-counsel for a law professors’ amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court 
asking it to reverse current, non-originalist doctrine that restricts defendant’s double jeopardy 
protections—in a case where doing so would involve overturning a defendant’s criminal 
conviction connected to a murder.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of 
Petitioner, Tyler v. United States No. 17-5410, 2017 WL 3588214 (Aug. 15, 2017). 
           Second, Zalman fails to discuss the fact that, in the 2000s, as a judge, I was a leading 
voice against mandatory minimum sentences.  My 75-page opinion decrying the 55-year 
mandatory sentence that I was forced to give Weldon Angelos was cited repeatedly by those 
opposing mandatory sentences—and became one of the most-often cited examples of injustice 
from those sentences.  Since leaving the bench, I have continued to press the attack, both in 
scholarly articles, see, e.g., Luna & Cassell, supra note 116, and in mass media appearances, 
see, e.g., Former Federal Judge Regrets 55-Year Marijuana Sentence, ABC NEWS (Feb. 18, 
2015), http://abcnews.go.com/US/federal-judge-regrets-55-year-marijuana-sentence/story?i
d=28869467.  I have also spoken out in favor of increased funding for federal public 
defenders.  See Paul Cassell & Nancy Gertner, Public Defenders Falls to the Sequester: Steep 
Budget Cuts Compromise the Justice System and Won’t Save Money in the Long Run, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/public-defenders-fall-to-the-sequester-
1377039667.  
           I have also been involved in advocating for rights for victims of crime in the criminal 
justice process, both in my legal scholarship, see, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Victims’ Rights 
Amendment: A Sympathetic, Clause-by-Clause Analysis, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 301 (2012), and 
in pro bono legal activities.  For example, I represented “Amy” before the U.S. Supreme Court 
in her efforts to obtain restitution in a child pornography case.  Paroline v. United States, 134 
S. Ct. 1710 (2014).  I have also joined Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe in urging that 
the U.S. Constitution be amended to add protections for crime victims.  See Laurence H. Tribe 
& Paul G. Cassell, Embed the Rights of Victims in the Constitution, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1998, 
at B7.  Because of this heavy involvement in the crime victims movement, I do have concerns 
about the suffering of crime victims—but expanding rights for crime victims does not equate 
with restricting rights for defendants.  See, e.g., Benji McMurray, The Mitigating Power of a 
Victim Focus at Sentencing, 19 FED. SENTENCING REP. 125 (2006).  In any event, concern for 
crime victims constitutes a “third model” of criminal process, outside the conventional two 
models into which Zalman seeks to shoehorn the world.  See generally Douglas Evan Beloof, 
The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 
289 (1999).   
 142  Other thoughtful commentators have suggested that my ideas are well worth exploring.  
See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, DNA Exonerations and the Elusive Promise of Criminal 
Justice Reform, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 271, 277 (2017) (“Cassell makes a strong case that, 
in a system with severely constrained resources, vindicating constitutional rights comes at the 
expense of protecting the innocent from conviction.”).   
CASSELL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:26 AM 
2018] UNDERSTANDING AND AVOIDING THE RISKS 1469 
rather due to the priority he would assign to other competing values.  As a 
result, it seems only fair to identify him not as a true innocentrist, but rather 
as a mere fair-weather friend of the innocent.  And others who give high 
priority to innocence should not be persuaded by his concerns. 
1. Abolishing the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, and 
Consequently Shifting Defense Resources Away from 
Litigating Purely Procedural Claims 
My writings argue that, if we want the criminal justice system to 
prioritize the issue of innocence, then a good start would be to reform the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.143  Abolition of the rule and replacing 
it with a system of civil damage remedies has been advocated by such 
distinguished legal figures as Chief Justice Warren Burger,144 Dallin Oaks,145 
Akhil Amar,146 Bill Pizzi,147 and Paul Robinson.148  The classic argument for 
ending the exclusionary rule is that the rule sets criminals free because the 
constable has blundered.149  But more subtle, and in many ways more 
pernicious, defects to the exclusionary rule exist.  Under a regime that allows 
the “deliberate exclusion of truth from the fact-finding process,”150 defense 
efforts will inevitably gravitate toward issues involving the validity of 
evidence collection rather than toward the evidence itself.  Professor William 
Stuntz perhaps most famously made this point in his writings, explaining 
how a system with limited resources that emphasizes procedure over 
substance will give short shrift to factual claims of innocence.151 Stuntz was 
cautious in his argument.  As he explained, the current system does not 
simply involve a direct tradeoff, but rather “places substantial pressure on 
[defense] counsel to opt for the procedural claim rather than the (potential) 
substantive one.”152  But Stuntz’s bottom-line conclusion seems 
unassailable: there is some tradeoff in the current regime favoring procedural 
 
 143   Cassell, Freeing the Guilty, supra note 9, at 1087–88; Cassell, Can We Protect the 
Innocent, supra note 11, at 274–75.   
 144  See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500–01 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 145  See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 665, 739–40 (1970). 
 146  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 40–45 (1997). 
 147  See WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL 
TRIALS HAS BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO REBUILD IT 
(1999). 
 148  PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL 
LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE (2006). 
 149  People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y.1926).  
 150  Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 151  William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 37–40 (1997). 
 152  Id. at 40. 
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claims over substantive ones. 
Given these trade-offs, those with an innocentric view of the world 
should be the first to jump on the replace-the-exclusionary-rule-with-civil-
damages bandwagon. Surely the experience of the rest of the world suggests 
that the exclusionary rule is not the only way to restrain police abuses.153 A 
damages regime can be crafted to fully (and better) protect Fourth 
Amendment rights, just as we rely on damages regimes to protect other civil 
liberties, such as our First Amendment rights.154 
Zalman responds at length to my arguments but, tellingly, his response 
does not focus on their merits—i.e., whether abolishing the exclusionary rule 
would be desirable for innocent suspects enmeshed in the system.  Indeed, 
Zalman begins his critique by conceding that, “[a]s a matter of logic, 
eliminating the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule cannot lead to 
wrongful convictions, because possession of contraband signals 
guilt . . . .”155  Moreover, Zalman argues – as many of the rule’s critics have 
contended—that “[o]ne consequence of the exclusionary rule is widespread 
police perjury covering illegal searches.”156  Given that such misconduct can 
easily lead to a wrongful convictions,157 one would think that a reduction 
would, from an innocentric perspective, highly desirable.  Zalman then 
argues that “corrupt drug law enforcement” has led to the conviction of 
innocent persons, pointing to the Rampart scandal in Los Angeles and similar 
miscarriages of justice elsewhere.158  But after running through the disturbing 
particulars of these cases, Zalman readily admits that “[t]hese corrupt and 
blatant Fourth Amendment violations were undeterred by the exclusionary 
rule, providing an occasion to rethink the control of illicit police behavior 
with methods that go beyond the rule.”159  Precisely!  Part of my argument 
was that a damages regime for protecting Fourth Amendment rights could 
be crafted that would be stronger than the exclusionary rule—and Zalman 
could have helped advance the discussion by endorsing it. 
 
 153  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that 
when adopted, the exclusionary rule was “unique to American jurisprudence” and that “a 
categorical exclusionary rule has been ‘universally rejected’ by other countries”); see also 
William T. Pizzi, The Need to Overrule Mapp v. Ohio, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 679, 717–29 
(2011) (discussing limited use of exclusionary remedies in Canada, New Zealand, England 
and Ireland). 
 154  See AKHIL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27–29 (1998) 
(explaining why the exclusionary rule is a bad way to deter police misconduct compared to a 
civil damages regime).  
 155  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1383 (quoting Zalman & Grunewald, supra note 203, at 252).   
 156  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1383 (quoting Zalman & Grunewald, supra note 203, at 252).   
 157  The National Registry of Exonerations identifies “official misconduct” as a 
contributing factor in 52% of all the cases included there.  % Exonerations, supra note 123 .   
 158  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1384. 
 159  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1384.  
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Zalman also contends that “the Supreme Court’s virtual ‘drug 
exception’ to the Fourth Amendment”160 has “indirectly” led to the 
conviction of “thousands” of innocent persons for drug crimes.161  If I 
understand the argument correctly, Zalman believes that the Supreme Court 
has played “an enabling role” in allowing drug prosecutions to proceed.  But 
one could just as easily assert that the Supreme Court has played an 
“enabling role” in allowing innocent persons to be convicted of rape by 
allowing prosecutions for sex offenders to proceed.  To be sure, one can 
criticize aspects of the war on drugs, as I have at length elsewhere.162 And 
one can even make the argument that drug prosecutions should cease.  But 
reducing the number of criminal indictments is not truly an innocence-based 
reform.  One could just as easily propose invalidating any criminal charges 
prosecutors file on a Monday (rather than the other four weekdays), and then 
take credit for a 20% reduction in wrongful convictions.  Arguments against 
the existence of certain crimes, however well-founded they may be, are not 
arguments about how to structure our criminal justice system to protect the 
innocent once we have decided how many crimes should be encompassed in 
the criminal code.  And, of course, issues surrounding the exclusionary rule 
are not confined to the drug cases, but readily extend more broadly to other 
cases involving possession of contraband or other evidence—e.g., 
firearms—cases which extend to serious crimes of violence. These are areas 
where the case for abolishing the exclusionary rule are at their zenith,163 and 
yet Zalman avoids commenting on them. 
Ultimately, by refusing to endorse abolition of the exclusionary rule, 
Zalman can stay in good graces with other like-minded liberals.164 But he 
reveals himself to be a mere fair-weather friend of innocence.  If Zalman 
were a true innocentrist, he should first analyze whether the proposed 
 
 160  For support for the idea that an exception exists, Zalman cites several law review 
articles, most of which are quite dated.  This conveniently allows him to avoid discussing the 
fact that the Supreme Court has recently handed down a number of decisions in drug cases, 
vigorously upholding Fourth Amendment rights.  See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 135 
S. Ct. 1609 (2015) (prolonging traffic stop to wait for drug detection dog after traffic violation 
and related safety concerns were addressed violated Fourth Amendment); Riley v. California, 
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (searching digital information on a cell phone of arrestee generally 
requires a warrant); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (use of drug detection dog on front 
porch violates Fourth Amendment); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (installing 
Global Position System on vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment). 
 161  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1383.   
 162  See Luna & Cassell, supra note 116 (criticizing mandatory minimum sentencing 
schemes).   
 163  See John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974).   
 164  In a reply to my article, Zalman “come[s] out of the ideological closet as a liberal (of 
sorts).”  Marvin Zalman, A Brief Reply to Professor Cassell, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1493 
(2018).  But cf. Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 
1999 U. ILL L. REV. 363 (1999).   
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abolition of the rule reduces the number of wrongful convictions.  From 
Zalman’s failure to directly engage my arguments on this point, I conclude 
that he thinks it does.  Zalman could have then proceeded to the second step 
– noting that abolition of the rule does not impair prosecution of the guilty 
and therefore, for a true innocentrist, a presumption of desirability arises.  
And given the reasonable alternatives that could be put in place for the rule 
(as Zalman himself implicitly concedes), there are no strongly countervailing 
values that should lead him to reject the proposal.  Zalman’s refusal to 
endorse abolition of the rule may be good politics in his field of criminology 
(which appears to be dominated by conventional “liberal” thinking165) – but 
it is hardly good for preventing wrongful convictions. 
2. Replacing the Miranda Regime with the Videotaping of 
Custodial Interrogations 
Another reform measure that I proposed was replacing Miranda with 
videotaping of interrogations.  I explained that “those who are most 
concerned about innocence should be skeptical of the law’s current structure, 
which relies largely on Miranda warnings and waivers to protect against 
coercive interrogations. As a practical matter, this approach does little to help 
the innocent and prioritizes litigation about Miranda compliance over 
litigation about the accuracy of confessions.”166  The Miranda warnings-and-
waiver regime is not well suited to addressing false confession issues.  As 
Professor Steven Duke has observed, Miranda “serves mainly to distract 
lawyers, scholars, and judges from considering the real problem of 
interrogation, which is how to convict the guilty while protecting the 
innocent.”167  For example, innocent suspects are most likely to waive their 
Miranda protections; innocent persons have nothing to hide from the police, 
and so they almost invariably waive their Miranda rights.168  Once they 
waive their rights, the Miranda procedures do little (if anything) to restrain 
 
 165  Last year, two criminologists described the extreme leftward bias of the criminology 
field: “Evidence of the liberal tilt in criminology is widespread. Surveys show a 30:1 ratio of 
liberals to conservatives within the field, a spread comparable with that in other social 
sciences.  The largest group of criminologists self-identify as radical or “critical.” These 
designations include many leftist intellectual orientations, from radical feminism to Marxism 
to postmodernism.”  John Paul Wright & Matt DeLisi, What Criminologists Don’t Say, and 
Why, CITY J., (N.Y. 2017), https://www.city-journal.org/html/what-criminologists-dont-say-
and-why-15328.html.  Interestingly, while Zalman thinks it relevant to identify my “vision” 
of the criminal justice system as being “conservative,” see Zalman, supra note 6, at 1357, he 
does not trouble to identify even a single one of his other sources as having a “liberal” vision.   
 166  Cassell, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 11, at 275.   
 167  Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 
551, 566–67 (2007); see also Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
71 (2006).   
 168  See Cassell, supra note 85, at 539–40. 
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police questioning, a point that seems to be generally accepted.169 
Miranda’s procedural requirements (like those of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule, just discussed) also shift defense attorney 
time and attention away from claims of innocence.170  Miranda has also 
caused trial judges to turn away from questions of the reliability of 
confessions and focus on questions about police compliance with the 
Miranda rules.171  Again as Professor Duke has explained, not only is 
Miranda “virtually useless”, but it “replaced a vibrant and developing 
voluntariness inquiry that took into account the vulnerabilities of the 
particular suspect as well as the inducement and conditions of the 
interrogation.”172  The bottom line is that “not only has Miranda allowed the 
police to disregard actual voluntariness, it has enabled the courts to be 
equally unconcerned with actual innocence.”173  To ameliorate these harms 
from the Miranda rules, I have proposed for more than twenty years that 
Miranda’s procedural regime be replaced with a system of modified 
warnings and videotaping of police interrogations.174 
In addressing my proposals, Professor Zalman begins with an ad 
hominem attack, stating in his opening sentence that “[r]idding the world of 
the Miranda decision has been Cassell’s life long quest” and quoting a 
newspaper article calling my efforts “ideologically driven.”175  But after that 
opening introduction, we learn that Zalman (who, we are left to assume, is 
not ideologically driven) agrees that it is “wise to rethink some of the police 
processes addressed by Warren Court decisions.”176  Indeed, Zalman quickly 
concedes that many “criminal procedure scholars . . . think that Miranda and 
other Warren Court rulings having directed criminal lawyers to argue 
procedural issues rather than the facts of cases, an argument that clearly has 
merit.”177  Zalman agrees that I should “commended for having supported 
the video recording of confessions an early date,” something that Zalman 
believes demonstrates my “desire to effectively curb abusive police practices 
 
 169  Christopher Slobogin, Towards Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309 (2003) (arguing 
that Miranda has had an “immunizing” effect on deceptive interrogation tactics); OFFICE OF 
LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF 
PRETRIAL INTERROGATION 97–98 (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437 (1989). 
 170   Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent?, supra note 11, at 276. 
 171  Id.  
 172  Duke, supra note 167, at 564.   
 173  Jacobi, supra note 87, at 12.   
 174  Id.; see also Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 
NW. U.L. REV. 387 (1996).   
 175  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1381.   
 176  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1381.  
 177  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1381 (citing WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).   
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while promoting accuracy in the criminal justice process.”178 
Zalman next endorses my proposal for videorecording, but only as a 
supplement to Miranda instead of a substitute.  This conveniently allows him 
to avoid hard questions about tradeoffs.  For example, having agreed with 
me that Miranda has caused defense attorneys “to argue procedural issues 
rather than the facts of case,” one would think that from an innocentric 
perspective it would necessarily follow that refocusing those defense efforts 
would be good for innocent defendants.  While acknowledging that this 
argument has “merit,”179 Zalman never explains why he ultimately rejects it. 
Zalman also does not engage another important issue for those concerns 
about the innocent.  As I have argued in a number of articles, good reasons 
exist for believing that Miranda has significantly hampered the ability of 
police officers to obtain confessions from guilty criminals.180  My most 
recent extensive article on this subject (co-authored with economist Richard 
Fowles) appeared a few months ago with new regression equations and other 
econometric analysis supporting this conclusion.181  Zalman does not take 
sides on this empirical debate, calling it “contentious.”182  But if Miranda 
has reduced law enforcement’s ability to obtain confessions, it has not only 
harmed law enforcement’s ability to convict guilty criminals but also the 
opportunity of innocent individuals to use those confessions to exonerate 
themselves.183 For example, Professor Gross has observed that the number 
of exonerations resulting from the true criminal confessing declined 
sometime between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s.184  Gross cites among 
the possible causes the Miranda decision, which “may result in some 
reduction in the number of confessions.”185  For someone concerned about 
 
 178  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1384.   
 179  Id.  
 180  See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 387 (1996); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A 
Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1055 (1998); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An 
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996).  These conclusions 
are not universally accepted.  Compare, John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police 
Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L REV. 1147 (1998) (critiquing the validity of the data used to 
correlate Miranda with diminished clearance), with Paul G. Cassell, Falling Clearance Rates 
After Miranda: Coincidence or Consequence?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1998) (responding to 
these criticisms). 
 181  Cassell & Fowles, supra note 76. 
 182  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1381.   
 183  See Cassell, supra note 85, at 550–52. 
 184  Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 
J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 430–31 (1987). 
 185  See Cassell, supra note 85, at 51.  For reasons to think that Miranda is the most likely 
cause of this drop in confessions, see Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs, supra note 180, at 285. 
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the innocent, getting to the bottom of this debate should be a high priority.186 
A system that respects the constitutional right against self-
incrimination, while at the same time providing greater protection for 
innocent suspects, could be easily designed.  There appears to be wide 
agreement that video recording interrogations would offer superior 
protection for innocent suspects than does the current Miranda regime.187  A 
fair number of jurisdictions are moving forward with requiring video 
recording of at least some interrogations,188 although recording is often left 
to the discretion of police officers or mandated only for very serious crimes. 
Zalman (and, more broadly, others in the innocence movement) could 
help speed the adoption of this important reform if they would highlight the 
extent to which Miranda does not offer effective protection to the innocent 
and suggest that we need to replace it with something like videorecording.  
Of course, coupling a restriction of the Miranda requirements with 
innocence-protective reforms would be a compromise approach that would 
be more likely to attract consensus support.  Moving in this direction also 
has the great advantage of not interfering with the conviction of the guilty.  
It appears that video recording does not greatly interfere with the ability of 
law enforcement to obtain confessions (although further investigation of this 
subject is important).  And, of course, if the Miranda rules were relaxed or 
replaced by video recording, there would be an unambiguous boost to 
prosecution efforts. 
From Zalman’s innocentric perspective, the first and most important 
step in evaluating this reform should be whether it reduces wrongful 
convictions.  Of course, that is the centerpiece of my position that 
videotaping should replace Miranda—rather than be piled on top of it—and 
Zalman essentially admits that he wants to avoid the question.189  But for a 
true innocentrist, this head-in-the-sand approach would be anathema.  Once 
again, it appears that Zalman is placing other values (and perhaps approval 
from like-minded criminology colleagues) ahead of protecting the innocent. 
 
 
 
 186  See generally Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from Lost Confessions and 
False Confessions—and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998).  
 187  See Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed 
It, How We Got It—and What Happened To It, 5 OHIO. ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 189–90 (2007). 
 188  See Alan M. Gershel, A Review of the Law in Jurisdictions Requiring Electronic 
Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9 (2010); Michael S. Schmidt, 
In Policy Change, Justice Dept. to Require Recording of Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES (May 
22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/us/politics/justice-dept-to-reverse-ban-on-
recording-interrogations.html.   
 189  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1381.   
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3. Refocus Post-Conviction Relief on Claims of Factual 
Innocence 
Another measure I (and others) have proposed to help the innocent is 
to refocus post-conviction relief on claims of factual innocence.  This 
proposal stems from the fact that “[o]ne of the great problems for the 
innocence movement is trying to find the needles in a large haystack—that 
is, trying to identify innocent persons in a criminal justice system that 
processes mostly guilty defendants.”190  The empirical basis for this proposal 
comes from, among other places, two distinguished legal scholars, Joseph 
Hoffmann and Nancy King.  They proposed that federal habeas corpus 
review of noncapital state court convictions and sentences should, with 
narrow exceptions, be abolished except for those who couple a constitutional 
claim with “clear and convincing proof of actual innocence.”191  Relying on 
a comprehensive study of federal habeas corpus filings,192  Hoffman and 
King found that only seven of the 2,384 noncapital habeas filings in the study 
(0.29%) resulted in a grant of habeas relief, and one of those seven was later 
reversed on appeal.193  Hoffmann and King argued that habeas review of such 
claims “currently squanders resources while failing to remedy defense-
attorney deficiencies.  Those resources should be redeployed where they 
have a more meaningful chance of preventing the deficiencies in the first 
place.”194 Hoffmann and King’s proposal is similar to others that have tried 
to focus habeas corpus or other post-conviction remedies on protecting the 
innocent, including Judge Henry Friendly,195 Professors John Jeffries, Jr. and 
William Stuntz,196 Professor Samuel Gross,197 Professor Stephanie 
Hartung198  and Professor Helen Anderson.199  In my earlier writings, I have 
noted that post-conviction review, by definition, cannot interfere with the 
 
 190  Cassell, supra note 11, at 273.   
 191  Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal 
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 820 (2009). 
 192  NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf. 
 193  Id. at 52, 58, 115–16. 
 194  Hoffman & King, supra note 53, at 823. 
 195  See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 U. CHI L. REV. 143 (1970). 
 196  John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default 
in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (1990). 
 197  Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and Sorting Criminal 
Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009 (2011). 
 198  Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Postconviction Procedure: The Next Frontier in 
Innocence Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE 
YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 247 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017); Stephanie Roberts 
Hartung, Habeas Corpus for the Innocent, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. Change 1 (2016).   
 199  Helen A. Anderson, Revising Harmless Error: Making Innocence Relevant to Direct 
Appeals, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 391 (2011).  
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process of convicting the guilty at trial.  Accordingly, post-conviction review 
offers a particularly promising approach for escaping the tradeoffs identified 
by Laudan (among others)—it would focus resources on the innocent, not 
the guilty.200 
Professor Zalman chooses not to comment on (much less endorse) this 
important reform, noting only that it is a topic of “current debate among 
leading habeas scholars.”201  As well it might be.  Habeas scholars, writing 
from differing perspectives, likely will have differing points of view about 
the need for expanding or narrowing prisoners access to habeas corpus relief.  
But the important first question for an innocentrist should not be what effect 
the proposal may have on prisoners’ rights, but what effect the proposal has 
on the innocent.  Zalman appears to be remarkably uninterested in this 
subject, perhaps because it would reduce the effectiveness of his claim that 
this reform is somehow rooted in a “conservative, crime control model vision 
of criminal justice”202—a vision that (on this topic at least) is shared in 
important measure, as noted above, by (among others) Judge Friendly and 
Professors Hoffman, King, Jeffries, Stuntz, Gross, Hartung, and Anderson. 
By missing an opportunity to discuss (and perhaps even endorse) post-
conviction reforms, Professor Zalman misses an important opportunity to 
help create common ground for proposals that might have a real opportunity 
of succeeding in legislative bodies.  As Zalman and Grunewald point out in 
their article discussing trial reforms, changes to long-established trial 
procedures may be highly contentious and lack the institutional support 
necessary to flourish.203  On the other hand, as the list of distinguished 
scholars recounted above suggests, post-conviction reforms may attract more 
consensus and be easier to achieve.  And given the fact that post-conviction 
reforms offer an opportunity to largely or entirely escape the kinds of “deadly 
dilemmas” that inhere in measures to protect the innocent in earlier parts of 
the criminal justice process, they certainly are worthy of considerable 
discussion as part of this symposium.  Once again, Zalman’s failure to do so 
may suggest that his perspective on the criminal justice system is less 
“innocentric” than he would have readers believe. 
 
 200  Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent?, supra note 11, at 273.  A similar point can be 
made in support of proposals to give close attention to post-conviction recantation by trial 
witnesses.  See, e.g., Rob Warden, Reacting to Recantations, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND 
THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 106 (Daniel S. 
Medwed ed., 2017). 
 201  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1378 (citing John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital 
Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 96 CORN. L. REV. 4365 (2011)).   
 202  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1386. 
 203  See Marvin Zalman & Ralph Grunewald, Reinventing the Trial: The Innocence 
Revolution and Proposals to Modify the American Criminal Trial, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 189, 
256 (2015).   
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4. Requiring All Defense Attorneys to Directly Ask Their 
Clients, “Did You Commit the Crime?” and Aggressively 
Investigate Claims of Actual Innocence 
As I have argued in my earlier writings, a critical resource in the effort 
to prevent wrongful convictions is defense attorneys.204  Yet much innocence 
literature seems to focus attention on prosecutors as the ultimate source of 
problems.205  For example, Professor George Thomas has recently called 
prosecutors “the thin last line protecting the innocent.”206  And Thomas is 
surely right that prosecutors have critical steps they can take to reduce 
wrongful convictions, such as by fully discharging their Brady obligations 
to produce exculpatory evidence (a point I have pressed elsewhere).207 
But recent reform efforts have largely overlooked what may be an even 
more important bulwark against false convictions: defense attorneys.  While 
occasionally innocence reformers will make a nod to defense attorneys as 
potential cause of wrongful convictions,208 they rarely include defense 
attorneys as part of the cure.  And yet, if we are truly looking for a last line 
of defense against wrongful conviction, defense attorneys seem like strong 
candidates.  They have direct access to the defendant, as well as a 
constitutional right to resources to conduct an adequate defense.209 
  Naturally, one can debate whether defense attorneys actually end up 
receiving adequate resources210—a subject I turn to in the next section.  
Additionally, one can argue that judges and others simply turn a blind eye to 
incompetent defense lawyers, allowing them continue to practice their 
trade.211  But unfortunately, another significant problem is simply the 
mindset of the defense bar toward the question of whether their clients are in 
fact guilty.  This outlook has been aptly described as one of “staggering 
 
 204  Cassell, Freeing the Guilty, supra note 9, at 1092–94; Cassell, Can We Protect the 
Innocent, supra note 11, at 277–80. 
 205  See, e.g., Dana Carver Boehm, The New Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Prosecutorial Ethics 
and the Evaluation of Actual Innocence, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 613 (2014). 
 206  George Thomas, Prosecutors: The Thin Last Line Protecting the Innocent, in 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE 
INNOCENT 208 (Daniel Medwed ed. 2017). 
 207  See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 9, at 1084–86. 
 208  See, e.g., Zalman, supra note 6 (noting the ineffective assistance of counsel is on the 
“canonical” list of causes of wrongful conviction but not otherwise discussing the issue).  See 
also infra notes and accompanying text (collecting statistics on role of defense attorneys in 
wrong conviction). 
 209  Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).   
 210  See, e.g., Meredith J. Duncan, “Lucky” Adnan Syed: Comprehensive Changes to 
Improve Defense Lawyering and Better Protect Defendants’’ Sixth Amendment Rights, 82 
BROOK. L. REV. 1651, 1710–11 (2017).   
 211  Id.  at 1705–06.   
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indifference.”212 Defense attorneys simply cannot consider whether their 
clients are guilty, it is argued, because doing so would impair the quality of 
the representation they provide.213  And, more broadly it is argued, focusing 
on innocence issues may distract society from dealing with mass 
incarceration and other issues associated with the guilty.214 
Approaching this subject from an innocentric perspective, however, we 
would certainly want defense attorneys to focus on (among other things) the 
factual innocence of their clients.  To address the lack of attention to 
innocence, I proposed that we could reorient defense counsel by simply 
requiring them to ask their clients about the subject.  As remarkable though 
it may sound, many defense attorneys do not directly ask their clients 
whether they are guilty of the crime charged.215 The literature on defense 
counsel interviews describes competing approaches. In what has been called 
the “traditional model,” a defense attorney’s client is urged to disclose 
everything about the crime under a pledge of confidentiality.216 But a 
different approach to the interview involves less fulsome disclosures. Under 
the “selective ignorance” model, a defense attorney consciously avoids 
obtaining full knowledge of her client’s involvement in the crime.217 Instead, 
she will obtain information only about certain useful facts, while avoiding 
acquiring knowledge about the bedrock issue of the defendant’s guilt. An 
attorney might employ different devices to be selectively ignorant. In one 
commonly-suggested approach, a defense attorney might never ask the 
defendant whether he committed the crime, asking the defendant instead to 
recount only what the prosecution’s witnesses are likely to say.218 
How often do criminal defense attorneys employ the selective 
ignorance model?  Good data are hard to come by, but indications suggest 
this model is a fairly common approach.  For instance, one interviewer of 
white collar defense attorneys reported that, “[o]f the attorneys I studied, 
most either said that they sometimes preferred not to get certain facts from a 
client or showed by their actions that they felt this way.”219 
 
 212   Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 180 (1983). 
 213  See id.; see also Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 449 (2001). 
 214  Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project: A Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Growing 
Anxiety About Innocence Projects, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 329 (2010). 
 215  Cassell, supra note 9, at 1068-69.   
 216  See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS (3d 
ed. 2004). 
 217  Id. at 159–60. 
 218  See, e.g., id. at 193–94 (discussing suggestion by Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. 
that defense attorneys can avoid the rules against knowingly presenting perjured testimony by 
proceeding in this fashion). 
 219  KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT 
WORK 104 (1985). 
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Forcing defense attorneys to truly attempt to learn whether their clients 
are guilty or innocent would create a real benefit: it would give the criminal 
justice system one more opportunity to begin sorting innocent defendants 
from guilty ones through the one person who has the best access to important 
information—the defendant. It is true, of course, that defense attorneys have 
difficulties obtaining access to witnesses and other forms of evidence.220  But 
the barriers to information are not all one-sided. Prosecutors are usually 
precluded from talking to defendants once legal counsel enters the scene. Yet 
defendants are obviously in a unique position to provide information that can 
sort the guilty from the innocent.221 If defendants can be induced to provide 
more thorough information to their attorneys about whether they are 
innocent or guilty, then the system can more effectively protect against 
wrongful conviction. 
If a defendant claims to be innocent, as a first step defense counsel 
obviously ought to adequately investigate the claim. Presumably adequate 
defense investigation of innocence happens in many cases,222 regardless of 
whether a defendant claims to be innocent or guilty. But if some defense 
attorneys are not squarely raising the innocence issue because they think 
ignorance is tactically useful, they may end up missing a chance to discover 
exculpatory evidence that could set a defendant free.223 
In response to this proposal, Professor Zalman rolls out a big rhetorical 
cannon, calling my suggestion a “radical threat to the adversary system”224 
because my argument relies on the assertion that “[i]nnocent persons 
ensnared in the criminal justice system have a stronger claim to our attention 
than do the guilty.”225  Zalman concedes that this positon “might be arguably 
 
 220  See Mosteller, supra note 78, at 941–43 (discussing “limited defense access to 
witnesses and evidence”). 
 221  See Slobogin, supra note 125, at 707 (“[T]he defendant is probably the single most 
important source of information about events relating to the offense.”).   
 222  But cf. Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal 
Disputes, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091 (2014) (arguing that certain structural defects in the 
criminal justice system mean that defense counsel cannot adequately investigate); Andrew D. 
Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1123 (2005) (arguing that current pretrial procedures prevent innocent persons from 
collecting exculpatory evidence).   
 223  See Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REV. 485, 510 (2000) (reporting 
an example of a seemingly delusional defendant blaming thefts on a “chicken man”; defense 
investigation discovers that man in a chicken suit perpetrated the crimes). 
 224  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1385. It seems indisputable that some changes in the 
adversary system would benefit innocents.  See generally D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. 
Risinger, Innocence Is Different: Taking Innocence into Account in Reforming Criminal 
Procedure, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 869 (2012) (proposing non-adversarial, joint investigative 
processes before charges are filed). 
 225  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1384 (quoting Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent?, supra 
note 11, at 278) (emphasis added).   
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correct from an ethical position”; but Zalman argues that this is not “a correct 
statement of my understanding of the law,”226 although he offers no 
supporting citation or authority for his legal claim. 
Here Zalman reveals his true colors.  In response to my reform proposal 
designed to help innocent defendants ensnared in the criminal justice system, 
Zalman rejects my view (it bears repeating) that innocents “have a stronger 
claim to our attention than do the guilty.”  I can certainly understand 
someone attacking my position.227  But it is difficult to understand the attack 
coming from someone claiming to be sailing under the banner of 
“innocentrism.” Indeed, it is even more curious that Zalman critiques me 
while labelling me as an “anti-Blackstonian,” apparently not recognizing that 
the label truly applies more directly to his apparent disagreement with my 
stance that the innocent have a stronger claim to our attention than the guilty. 
But setting labels aside, what about the substantive part of Zalman’s 
argument that requiring defense attorneys to ask their clients whether they 
are guilty somehow unlawfully interferes with the adversary system?  It is 
hard to see how this would be so.  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
“[t]he need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both 
fundamental and comprehensive.”228  And the Supreme Court has held that 
defense counsel’s duty to investigate extends both to “‘matters of fact’” and 
“‘points of law.’”229  Proceeding from these premises, under current (2015) 
American Bar Association (ABA) Defense Function Standards, defense 
counsel has “a duty to investigate in all cases.”230  Likewise, under these 
standards, “[d]efense counsel’s investigative efforts should commence 
promptly and should explore appropriate avenues that reasonably might lead 
to information relevant to the merits of the matter, consequences of the 
criminal proceedings, and potential dispositions and penalties.”231  
 
 
 
 226  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1385. 
 227  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 214, at 324 ([T]the defendant with the factual innocence 
story throws every other defendant under the bus.”).   
 228  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); see also Strickland v. Washingtion, 
466 U.S. at 691 (“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”). 
 229  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 827 n.35 (1975) (quoting 2 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A 
SYSTEM OF LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 398–99 (1796)). 
 230  FOURTH EDITION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 
4-4.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION THIRD EDITION § 4-3.2 cmt. at 152 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 1993), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justi
ce_standards/prosecution_defense_function.authcheckdam.pdf (“The lawyer who is ignorant 
of the facts of the case cannot serve the client effectively.”).   
 231  FOURTH EDITION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, § 4-4.1(c). 
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Of particular relevant to my proposal, under current ABA Defense 
Functions Standards defense counsel are required to conduct a thorough 
interview of the defendant to “determine in depth the client’s view of the 
facts and other relevant facts known to the client.”232  The Standards also 
emphasize that defense counsel “should explain, at an appropriate time, the 
necessity for frank and honest discussion of all facts known to the client in 
order to provide an effective defense.”233  
Professor Zalman appears to be entirely unaware of these ethical 
requirements.  Instead, Zalman asserts (again without any supporting 
authority) that full knowledge of a defendant’s information would “make 
defendants’ lawyers structurally subservient to prosecutors, at least by 
limiting the scope of defense cross-examination of witnesses.”234  Zalman’s 
use of the term “subservient” seems a bit odd here, since prosecutors are 
presumably subject to the same ethical restraints.  But in any event, what 
Zalman seems to be driving at is that defense attorneys’ ignorance may 
permit them to offer evidence that would otherwise be precluded by the rules 
of legal ethics.  ABA MODEL RULE 3.3 provides that a lawyer shall not 
“knowingly . . . offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”235 
Zalman may be descriptively correct that defense attorneys will be 
unable to offer false evidence if they know of their client’s guilt.  But from 
a normative perspective—and certainly from an innocentric perspective—no 
good reason exists for giving defense counsel such freedom.  It is hard to see 
what larger societal interest is served by allowing counsel to move forward 
in ignorance of this important fact. 
To be sure, it may be true, as some defense advocates have argued, that 
a defense attorney can never be entirely sure whether her client is telling the 
truth when a defendant claims to be innocent.236  But requiring defense 
attorneys to at least ask that basic question would serve the valuable function 
 
 232  Id. § 4-3.3(c)(1).   
 233  Id. § 403.1 (emphasis added); see also NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, 
PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION § 4.1(b)(2) (2006), 
http://www.nlada.org/defender-standards/performance-guidelines/black-letter (“[A]n in-
depth interview of the client should be conducted as soon as possible and appropriate . . . The 
interview with the client should be used to . . . seek information concerning the incident or 
events giving rise to the charge(s) . . . .”).   
 234  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1385.   
 235  ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). But cf. 
Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission”: Reflections on the “Right” To 
Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987) (suggesting that there are, in 
practice, few limits on the defense).  
 236  See Robert Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care About Innocence, 
50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 41 (2010).  Most defendants presumably will admit they are 
guilty.  Cf. Poveda, Estimating Wrongful Convictions, 18 JUST. QUART. 689, 701 (2001) 
(noting that about 15% of convicted inmates claimed to have not committed the crime for 
which they had been imprisoned, implying an 85% admission rate). 
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of putting this issue squarely out in the open, helping innocent defendants.  
If we truly want to structure an “innocentric” criminal justice system that 
gives highest priority to preventing the conviction of the innocent,237 defense 
attorneys must be involved. In fact, defense attorneys—who (unlike 
prosecutors) have constant and direct access to defendants—may be 
uniquely positioned to identify a miscarriage of justice before it happens and 
take steps to prevent it.  They are also well-poised to increase the 
“diagnosticity” of the system, by helping to flag the relatively small 
percentage of cases in the system genuinely involving factual innocence 
claims.238  And the only “cost” is that defense counsel for some guilty 
defendants might be limited in the kinds of false evidence they can present 
at trial—a “cost” (if that is the right word) that society surely ought to be 
willing to bear to have a system that more accurately sorts the innocent from 
the guilty. 
This is not simply my (allegedly “anti-Blackstonian”) view of the 
competing concerns, but the view of others,239 including most notably the 
American Bar Association.  The ABA Standards for Defense Counsel make 
clear that defense attorneys should not try to maintain a “calculated 
ignorance” about guilt.  The Standards provide that “[w]hen asking the client 
for information and discussing possible options and strategies with the client, 
defense counsel should not seek to induce the client to make factual 
responses that are not true.  Defense counsel should encourage candid 
disclosure by the client to counsel and not seek to maintain a calculated 
ignorance.”240 These conclusions are fit comfortably with the related ethical 
rule—upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court—that defense attorneys may not 
assist their clients in presenting perjured testimony.241 
 
 237  See Medwed, supra note 41.   
 238  Cf. W. Tucker Carrington, “A House Divided”: A Response to Professor Abbe Smith’s 
In Praise of the Guilty Project: A Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Growing Anxiety About 
Innocence Projects, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 23 (2011) (providing an illustration of 
a case in which defense counsel obtained a dismissal from a prosecutor by sharing exculpatory 
evidence collected by defense investigators).   
 239  Tim Bakken, supra note 138, at 853 (“Professor Cassell is rightly concerned with 
situations where, with winks and nods, defense attorneys acquire enough evidence from their 
clients to mount a defense, but work assiduously to prevent their clients from saying to their 
attorneys, ‘I killed the victim intentionally and have no defense.’”).   
 240  ABA Defense Standards, supra note 230, § 4-3.3(d); see also ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function § 4-3.2(b) (3d ed. 1993) (defense counsel 
“should not instruct the client or intimate to the client in any way that the client should not be 
candid in revealing facts so as to afford defense counsel free rein to take action which would 
be precluded by counsel’s knowing of such facts”).   
 241  Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (discussing ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980), entitled “Representing a Client Within the 
Bounds of the Law,” which provides that “In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall 
not . . . [k]nowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence . . . [or] [c]ounsel or assist his 
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To be clear, none of this is to suggest that defense attorneys should roll 
over and play dead if their clients are guilty.  Indeed, the ethical rules make 
clear, for example, that while attorneys generally may not defend an issue 
“unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so,” this restriction does not 
apply to “[a] lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, . . . [who] 
may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element 
of the case be established.”242  In light of this fact, Professor Robert Mosteller 
(among many others) rightly bristles at the suggestion that there should be 
some sort of “second-class treatment” of defendants who state clearly that 
they are guilty.243 He explains quite nicely that defense counsel have 
important duties to perform in the criminal justice system, even when 
performing the most common duty of defending those who have in fact 
committed the crimes charged against them. But he interestingly goes on to 
discuss the idea that perhaps individual defense attorneys—or the criminal 
justice system more broadly—should try to devote additional resources to 
cases in which a defendant has a good claim of actual innocence.244  Of 
course, defense attorneys—and the system—are not well-positioned to do 
this if the defendant is not even asked whether he is in fact innocent. 
Requiring defense attorneys to directly ask their clients about guilt or 
innocence might also have other desirable consequences.  The wrongful 
conviction literature suggests it is unusual for a defense attorney to 
communicate her specific concerns directly to a prosecutor.245  Perhaps this 
is part of a larger culture of distrust between prosecutors and defense 
attorneys that appears to afflict at least some jurisdictions.246  But direct 
communication on innocence issues should be strongly encouraged.247 
It would, of course, be naive to think that simple defense counsel 
reports to prosecutors could prevent every wrongful conviction of an 
innocent defendant.  But perhaps an unfortunate reason why defense 
 
client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent.”).   
 242  ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 243  Mosteller, supra note 236, at 7.  
 244  Id. at 68–69. 
 245  See Carrington, supra note 238, at 23 (referring to the “unorthodox” approach of a 
defense team in a murder case sharing exculpatory evidence with the prosecutor).   
 246  See Lissa Griffin & Stacy Caplow, Changes to the Culture of Adversarialness: 
Endorsing Candor, Cooperation and Civility in Relationships Between Prosecutors and 
Defense Counsel, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845 (2011).   
 247  Id. at 869.  Cf. D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, The Emerging Role of 
Innocence Lawyer and the Need for Role-Differentiated Standards of Professional Conduct, 
in CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 123 (2014) (discussing strong “anti-
signaling” ethic, in which the criminal defense attorney is prevented from signaling to anyone 
by any means that a client is guilty, and by necessary implication, affirmatively discouraged, 
and perhaps even prevented, from effectively signaling that there is real reason to believe that 
the client is in fact factually innocent of the crime, as opposed to being formally “presumed 
innocent”). 
CASSELL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:26 AM 
2018] UNDERSTANDING AND AVOIDING THE RISKS 1485 
attorneys so rarely discuss the issue with prosecutors is that, as Mosteller 
suggests, defense attorneys simply do not view their job as having much to 
do with guilt or innocence.248  If defense attorneys proceed in this way, they 
never learn whether they have an innocent defendant for a client as opposed 
to a guilty one.  This agnostic approach may help to avoid burnout on the job 
or provide stronger feelings of self-worth, as some have argued in 
justification.249  But this strikes me as a cop-out, leading innocence reformers 
to point fingers at errant prosecutors and rogue police officers while too often 
ignoring the role of ignorant defense attorneys.  If we truly wish to leave no 
stone unturned in our efforts to prevent conviction of the innocent, it is time 
to broaden our perspective to include defense attorneys as those who have 
special responsibility—and special abilities—to prevent wrongful 
convictions.250  Those who genuinely adopt an innocentric perspective 
should have little difficulty with this conclusion. 
5. Increasing Resources for Indigent Defense Counsel and 
Prosecutors to Focus on Issues Relating to Actual Innocence 
On the issue of wrongful convictions, the elephant in the room is little 
discussed but obvious: money.  The root cause of many wrongful convictions 
is likely insufficient resources devoted to the criminal justice system. 
Whatever individual causes might be pinpointed in particular cases, more 
resources would often have enabled defense counsel (or police and 
prosecuting agencies) to locate persuasive evidence of innocence.251  If this 
diagnosis is correct, then an important part of the true solution to the 
wrongful conviction problem may be devoting additional resources to the 
criminal justice system.252 
 
 
 248  Mosteller, supra note 236, at 60–64; accord Babcock, supra note 212, at 180. 
 249  See generally Barbara Allen Babcock, Book Review, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 310, 315 
(1984). 
 250  One way to hold defense attorneys accountable for wrongful convictions would be 
through civil suits against them.  Recent cases seem to be broadening defense liability in this 
area.  See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Bulson, 79 A.D.3d 1587, 1589 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) 
(nonpecuniary loss damages are available for criminal defendant’s loss of liberty due to 
attorney malpractice); cf. Kevin Bennardo, Note, A Defense Bar: The “Proof of Innocence” 
Requirement in Criminal Malpractice Claims, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341 (2007) (proposing 
that defendants should not be required to prove that they are innocent to proceed with criminal 
malpractice claims). 
 251  See Robert Gehrke, If Utah Doesn’t Provide Better Legal Defense for the Poor, ACLU 
May File Lawsuit, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.sltrib.com/news/2966774-
155/if-utah-doesnt-provide-better-legal (discussing case of wrongful conviction in Utah 
where overworked public defender was apparently unable to obtain alibi witnesses).   
 252  See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Negotiating Accuracy: DNA in the Age of Plea 
Bargaining, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 
OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 85 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017). 
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Some sense of the funding problem’s size comes from data on the 
association between ineffective assistance of counsel and cases of wrongful 
conviction.253  A 2005 study by the Innocence Commission for Virginia 
reviewed original court files and interviewed key actors in 11 wrongful 
convictions cases and found evidence that the defense had fallen short in five 
of them.254  A similar review in New York in 2009 found defense failings in 
19 out of 53 cases.255 
Given the fiscal realities of the world we live in, however, it may be an 
academic proposal to call for significant new funding for defense attorneys, 
for example.256  At a macro level, the funds devoted to the criminal justice 
system are probably roughly fixed and not much is likely to change in the 
near term.257  What is needed, then, is to prioritize innocence over other 
criminal justice expenditures. 
Fortunately, for those who truly believe in “innocentrism,” there are 
ways to do this.  Each of the four preceding sections would involve a 
prioritization of cases involving innocent defendants over cases involving 
guilty one.  For example, abolishing the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule would free up defense resources to be used in litigating other issues, 
including innocence issues.  Once procedural issues regarding the legality of 
searches are diverted to the civil justice system, the criminal justice system 
would gain newly-available resources to devote to innocence issues. Instead 
of filing and litigating these motions having nothing to do with innocence, 
defense counsel could turn their attention to substantive issues revolving 
around guilt or innocence.  Prioritizing substantive issues over procedural 
issues is exactly the way the system should be structured—and a way that 
both increases the chance of convicting the guilty while reducing the chance 
of convicting the innocent. 
 
 
 253  The data in this paragraph come from Alissa Pollitz Worden et al., Public Defense in 
an Age of Innocence: The Innocence Paradigm and the Challenges of Representing the 
Accused, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 209, 
212 (Marvin Zalman & Julie Carrano eds., 2014). 
 254  Id. (citing INNOCENCE COMM’N FOR VA., A VISION FOR JUSTICE: REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA (2005)).   
 255  Id. (citing N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR 
ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS (Apr. 4, 2009), https://www.nysba
.org/wcreport/).   
 256  See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a 
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1059 (2006); Cassell & Gertner, supra note 141 
(urging that federal public defender funds not be sequestered).   
 257  See Erik Lillquist, Improving Accuracy in Criminal Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 897 
(2007) (noting a common assumption that there are fixed resources devoted to criminal 
justice). 
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Responding to my proposal, Professor Zalman first accuses me of 
“sleight of hand,” because I discussed this important issue towards the tail 
end of my list for reforms rather than the outset.258  But I was not trying to 
bury the lead, but rather to simply arrange them in sequential order.  I have 
employed the same approach here, first discussing ways to divert resources 
towards the innocent (such as abolishing the exclusionary rule) and then 
noting here how redirecting resources could be an important step in reducing 
wrongful convictions. 
Zalman also accuses me of “glaring internal inconsistency” in my 
approach.259  The basis for this charge is that I was concerned about a 
proposal that would have given defendants a largely-unrestrained “right” to 
demand that police investigate claims of alleged innocence.  I explained why 
such an expansive right for all defendants (both guilty and innocent) would 
divert “both police and judicial resources into many wild-goose chases.”260 
It is appropriate to worry that defendants, armed with a right to demand 
that police follow up purported leads showing innocence, might malicious 
send police in the wrong direction.  Guilty defendants have nothing to lose 
by flooding police agencies with leads regarding their innocence.  For 
example, a charged defendant might claim that the “real” criminal was either 
Able, Baker, or Charlie – and give police some half-baked theory for why 
each of these persons had committed the crime in question.  While the police 
are busy looking into Able, Baker, and Charlie, of course, they are unable to 
concentrate their efforts on the defendant.  And, of course, all this work 
forced on the police might simply put pressure on the prosecution to offer 
the defendant a more favorable plea again. 
In contrast, defendants have little incentive to send their own attorneys 
off in the wrong direction.  Defendants surely are aware that time, money, 
and resources in building the defense case are limited, and they would have 
no reason to squander them.  This is not to say that, occasionally, defendants 
may have case-specific reasons for misleading their attorneys.  Defendants 
may wish, to protect, for example, other family members or other reasons for 
being inaccurate with their attorneys.  But defendants lack any systemic 
reasons to ask for defense resources to be expended on running down false 
leads. 
More fundamentally, Zalman fails to appreciate how reforms such as 
the ones that I am proposing could free up significant resources for the 
defense.  Consider, for example, the proposal to abolish the exclusionary 
rule.  While the percentage of cases in which the exclusionary rule results in 
 
 258  Zalman supra note 6, at 1371.   
 259  Id. at  
 260  Cassell, Freeing the Guilty, supra note 9, at 1075.   
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guilty criminals going free is disputed,261 it appears to be undisputed that the 
exclusionary rule results in “tens of thousands of contested suppression 
motions each year.”262  These resources could all be redirected towards 
defendants raising plausible claims of factual innocence.  And, it is important 
to recall, that while the exclusionary rule involves a vast swath of cases in 
the criminal justice, cases involving the factually innocent—and unable to 
prove their innocence with existing resources—appear to constitute a tiny 
fraction.263 
My point is not that abolishing the exclusionary rule is a perfect 
solution to the problem of limited criminal justice resources; rather, my more 
limited (but nonetheless important) point is that a system without the 
exclusionary rule is better than the existing legal regime, at least when 
assessed from an innocentric perspective, because it permits significant 
resources to be redirected towards innocence issues.264  Anyone who views 
these innocentric from an innocentric perspective should endorse such 
reforms that shift resources toward the innocent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 261  Compare United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (arguing that the small 
percentage researchers deal with masks the large number of felons released from prison based 
in part on illegal searches and seizures), with id. at 950 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
only a very small percentage of all felony arrests are declined for prosecution on grounds of 
potential exclusionary rule problems); see also Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: 
Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting 
Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931, 955–56 (2010) (reporting his own experience that motions to 
suppress “posed only a minimal drain on defense resources; although his experience came in 
a system setting motions to suppress for argument on the eve of trial, thereby preventing most 
such motions from being litigated).   
 262  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 785 (2010) (quoting William Stuntz, The 
Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 444 (1997)).  
See also REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPACT OF THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 8 (1979) (10.5% of all 
defendants filed a motion to suppress based on search and seizure issues and 0.4% based on 
electronic surveillance issues).   
 263   See generally Cassell, Overstating America’s Wrongful Conviction Rate?, supra note 
14 (finding low rate of wrongful conviction).  Of course a low rate of wrongful conviction is 
not necessarily identical to a low rate of wrongful charging.  But given the parallels between 
the two—and the relatively small percentage of cases of wrongful conviction—it seems 
reasonable to conclude that a relatively small percentage of innocent defendants are 
wrongfully charged.   
 264  Cf. Worden et al., supra note 253, at 220 (“Were the system to prioritize the needs of 
the ‘truly innocent’ over the crowds of the merely ‘truly accused,’ it is not difficult to image 
reallocations of defense resources”).   
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6. More Research on the Frequency and Causes of Wrongful 
Convictions 
One final proposal on my list of measures to address the problem of 
wrongful convictions is further research on the extent and causes of the 
problem.265  Indeed, one of my cited authorities for such a proposal was 
Professor Zalman himself, who had previously written an article in which he 
had outlined a research agenda for innocence issues.266  I explained that 
“[f]or public policy purposes, we need more information—information 
about, for example, wrongful convictions through guilty pleas . . . and solid 
information about the incidence of wrongful convictions outside the areas of 
homicide and rape.”267  I also cited Professor Samuel Gross’ apt observation 
that  “[t]he most important question about false convictions is also the most 
basic: How frequently are innocent people convicted of crimes?”268 
To help answer such questions, I specifically suggested that  
researchers should draw a random sample of a large number of felony violent 
crime cases, track them through the system to identify cases in which 
wrongful conviction was even a possibility, and then press even further to 
try and get to the bedrock truth in this subset of case.269  I noted that such an 
approach had been followed in other countries.270  I concluded that such 
research “might be very valuable for revealing both the scope of the wrongful 
conviction problem and particular areas where wrongful convictions are 
prevalent.  This would permit a targeted response to the problem, perhaps 
more narrowly addressing the risk to the innocent without freeing the 
guilty.”271 
This approach would also respond to the problem that most of the 
current wrongful conviction research involves selecting the dependent 
variable—i.e., the research begins with a case a wrongful conviction and 
traces the case’s history back to the point at which it veered in the direction 
of a miscarriage of justice.272  This approach makes it difficult to draw firm 
 
 265  Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent?, supra note 11, at 271.  
 266  See Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano, Sustainability of Innocence Reform, 77 ALB. L. 
REV. 955, 983–93 (2014) (outlining research agenda for innocence issues).  Cf. Keith A. 
Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study Wrongful 
Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333 (2002).  My proposal is slightly different because I 
propose to conduct research to expand our knowledge about a random sample of wrongful 
convictions. 
 267   Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent?, supra note 11, at 271. 
 268   Samuel Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 173, 176 (2008). 
 269   Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent?, supra note 11, at 271. 
 270  See, e.g., Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Jon F. Sigurdsson, How Frequently Do False 
Confessions Occur?: An Empirical Study Among Prison Inmates, 1 PSYCHOL. CRIM & L. 21, 
25 (1994).   
 271  Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent?, supra note 11, at 271. 
 272  See Worden et al., supra note 253, at 13.   
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conclusions about the relative significance of various factors causing 
wrongful convictions, because some of those factors may be easier to detect 
than others.  For example, if mental disabilities are an especially important 
cause of wrongful conviction, but persons suffering from such disabilities 
have great difficulty in bring their plight to the attention of others, existing 
research will tend to understate the role of these disabilities in wrongful 
conviction.273 
In response, while Professor Zalman half-heartedly agrees that “[t]here 
is nothing objectionable to ‘more research,’”274 he hastens to add that funders 
of such a study “would have to evaluate its likely success and the lost 
opportunity costs of other kinds of research.”275  He then suggests that a 
different research project—”sentinel event initiation research”— would be 
one type of project that would be better than the frequency research that I 
proposed.276  Interestingly, in another of his recent articles, Zalman specified 
as a possible project research into whether “concern with actual innocence 
weaken [a country’s] crime control abilities as some conservative critics 
claim”277—a project that would seem to necessarily involve an inquiry into 
frequency of various criminal justice events. 
One would think that a self-professed “innocentric” scholar would be 
able to muster a more robust endorsement of a proposal to research the size 
and scope of the innocent problem.  But perhaps Professor Zalman’s concern 
is that the research might indicate that existing research has overstated the 
magnitude of the problem.  For instance, Professor Zalman is quick to cite 
Professor Risinger’s interesting and well-known study, finding a roughly 
3.3% wrongful conviction rate in high profile capital rape-murder cases in 
the 1980s, before the existence of DNA testing and other, more recently-
adopted protective measures against wrongful convictions.278  But the 
obvious question raised by such studies with such specialized samples is 
whether, assuming their findings are accurate, they apply more generally to 
the broader criminal justice system.  Indeed, Risinger himself cautioned that 
his findings were “necessarily subject to . . . further research,”279 and 
 
 273   Cf. Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged Cases 
of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 583–85 
(1999) (suggesting mental retardation may be an especially potent cause of false confessions).   
 274  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1372.   
 275  Id. at 1373.   
 276  Id. 
 277  Marvin Zalman, Wrongful Conviction: A Comparative Perspective 33 (May 4, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2899482. 
 278  Id. at 19 (citing D. Michael Risinger, Innocent Convicted, supra note 5).  Perhaps in 
an effort to make the study seem more broadly based than it was, Professor Zalman 
confusingly describes the study as involving “rape/murder” cases, but in fact it the study 
involved “capital rape-murders in the 1980s.” Risinger, supra, at 768. 
 279  Risinger, supra note 5, at 799.   
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discussed at great length the important question of whether it was possible 
to “generalize this [error] rate . . . to other sets of criminal convictions.”280 
Professor Zalman cites to Risinger, who argued (quite correctly in my 
view) that wrongful convictions were heavily “substructured,” by which he 
meant that certain types of cases are more likely to produce wrongful 
convictions than others.281  But Zalman’s conclusion from this point was 
revealing.  Zalman writes that “[u]ntil the field of wrongful conviction 
develops techniques parallel to those of geologists who can make cost-
effective guesses of where to dig, Cassell’s proposals could produce a dry 
well.”282  Of course, a “dry well” finding even in any particular substructure 
could be very important.  It could help researchers prospecting for wrongful 
convictions one place in the system to focus their efforts elsewhere.  For 
instance, I have previously suggested that an area in which wrongful reform 
efforts should be directed is cases involving defendants with mental 
disabilities.283  A research finding that, across a broad swatch of cases, 
wrongful convictions were concentrated among such defendants could be 
extremely important in channeling concern to this particular area. 
Zalman tips his hand when he professes concern about a “dry well” 
finding.  His point about substructuring, of course, applies not just to my 
proposed research but also to existing research, such as Professor Risinger’s.  
It may be that Professor Risinger has drilled into atypical group of cases 
(capital rape-murder cases in the 1980s) that are particularly likely to contain 
wrongful victims.  Indeed, Risinger himself seems to admit that this is a 
possibility.284  Research reporting dry wells in other, more typical, parts of 
the criminal justice system could be important to policy makers trying to 
assess the size and scope of the problem.  Research along the lines proposed 
should be a high priority for researchers interested in making sound public 
policy recommendations in this area. 
Indeed, I am happy to report that I am not the only one who has seen 
the need for more research on the frequency of wrongful convictions, 
including research based on samples from a particular jurisdiction.  Professor 
George Thomas, a distinguished legal scholar who has written frequently on 
innocence issues, had recently joined me a putting together a set of three 
articles that engage on this important topic.285  Both of us believe that some 
estimate of the frequency of wrongful convictions is important to the debate 
on this subject—and both of us have tried to derive estimates of a more 
 
 280  Id. at 782; see also id. at 782–88 (exploring this question).   
 281  Id.  at 782-85.   
 282  Zalman, supra note 6, at 1372–73.   
 283  See Cassell, supra note 273, at 582–85.   
 284  See Risinger, supra note 5, at 785–87. 
 285  See supra note 14. 
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generally-applicable wrongful conviction rate, including estimates based on 
jurisdiction-specific samples (from North Carolina and Utah). Professor 
Thomas and I do not pretend that our research has definitively resolved the 
subject.  But we do hope that it will begin to blaze a path toward greater 
understanding about the scope of the wrongful conviction problem. 
CONCLUSION 
Preventing wrongful conviction of the innocent is a fundamental 
priority of our criminal justice system. But it is obviously not the system’s 
only goal.  Efforts to prevent conviction of the innocent should avoid 
interfering with other objectives, most prominently the need to convict the 
guilty and prevent the suffering of future crime victims. 
The tradeoffs that inhere in our current criminal justice system can be 
reconfigured.  We might, for example, lower the burden of proof required to 
send repeat violent felons to prison for new crimes – as Professor Laudan 
has proposed in this symposium.  If Laudan’s proposal were implemented as 
part of a system of extended parole for violent crimes, constitutional 
objections could be avoided.  And the proposal might cost-beneficial, by 
increasing the certainty of punishment for the guilty while imposing a risk 
of wrongful conviction only on those who had been duly warned. 
But ultimately proposals such as Laudan’s require assessing tradeoffs.  
Some kinds of reforms can largely avoid debate about these tradeoffs—true 
“win-win” measures that simultaneously reduce the number of innocents 
wrongfully convicted while increasing (or least not decreasing) the number 
of violent criminals sent to prison.  This article lays out a few such 
possibilities, including replacing the exclusionary rule with a civil damage 
remedy, moving confession law away from technical Miranda procedures, 
confining habeas relief to those with claims of factual innocence, requiring 
defense attorneys to explore their clients’ guilt or innocence, and expanding 
resources devoted to substantive (rather than procedural) issues in the 
criminal justice system.  If we are truly committed to protecting the innocent, 
we can and should take such specific steps.  We can reduce the risk of 
wrongfully convicting the innocent without setting free more of the guilty. 
 
